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This thesis an analysis of the co-production of 
national defense by the Department of Defense (DoD), 
Congress, and the defense industrial base. The aim of the 
study will be to examine the evolution of the procurement 
and contracting process since World War II with a 
qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the increasingly 
symbiotic relationship between DoD and corporate America.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The interaction between the public and private sector 
for the provision of national security has evolved 
significantly over the last half-century. This relationship 
may no longer be viewed as merely transactional as each 
side has leveraged wartime and peacetime interaction to an 
increasing extent. While the defense industry has come to 
leverage its financial sustenance on the nation’s strategic 
direction, DoD has come to rely on upgrades in weapon 
systems and capabilities that may not have been otherwise 
unattainable in the same time frame. Defense co-production 
does not end there however. The funding authority that the 
legislative branch possesses makes it a key component of 
how national defense is ultimately realized. In addition, 
the involvement of Congress moves co-production from the 
purely defense realm to that of public policy as well. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objectives of this research is to answer 
the following questions: (1) How does the economic 
definition of co-production relate to defense/policy co-
production, (2) what was the sequence of events in the 
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evolution of the DoD-industry relationship, (3) how have 
the process and relationship evolved with regard to the 
procurement of military services, and (4) what are the 
potential benefits and pitfalls of the increasing symbiosis 
between DoD and the defense industry. 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To answer these questions I reviewed an extensive 
array of public materials including official federal 
reports, textbooks and academic studies from the fields of 
defense, economics, and public policy. In addition, video 
and structured personal interviews with industry experts 
were conducted and provided current and unique viewpoints 
on the subject matter. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Beginning with Chapter II, I define co-production and 
begin the explanation of how it applies to defense. With a 
discussion of the defense budgeting process I begin to show 
how the legislative branch influences defense by exercising 
its constitutionally granted authority over the process 
through controlling the flow of funds and ultimately public 
policy. In Chapter III, I describe the evolution of the 
defense industrial base since World War II. In Chapter IV, 
I discuss the current trends in defense co-production. In 
addition to this I detail the emergence of the private 
military companies that have become increasingly important 
and controversial. In Chapter V, I discuss my finding 
regarding the potential pitfalls that have accompanied the 
boom in defense capability and profits for the industry’s 
key firms. Finally, in Chapter VI, I present a summary, 
answers to the research questions posed in Chapter I, and 
recommendations based on my research.   
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II. CO-PRODUCTION AND THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT 
A. CO-PRODUCTION DEFINED 
The concept of co-production is a product of 
macroeconomic theory. Considered in this context, it 
describes the process by which firms collaborate with 
customers to provide services with mutual benefits. 
According to Xue and Harker, co-production describes the 
general case “wherein [a] firm can outsource any portion of 
the whole service task to the customer ranging from zero to 
100%.” (Xue and Harker, 2003: p.7) Current economic 
literature suggests that the driving forces behind this 
business model include cost-reduction, migrating price 
competition, and assets ownership. (Xue and Harker, 2003) 
According to Xue and Harker, the current co-production 
model is:  
…unique and significantly different from a third 
party usually considered in the outsourcing 
literature as customers play dual roles in the 
service operations processes and, consequently, 
have multiple influences on market competition. 
(Xue and Harker, 2003: p.7)    
 Although co-production is generally considered with 
regard to customer efficiency and competitive markets, the 
rudiments of the theory accurately describe the manner by 
which DoD and the nation’s industrial base collaborate for 
the provision of defense. (Xue and Harker, 2003)  
The fundamental process of co-production has been 
studied extensively at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center. Two of the Center’s 
management scientists, Mei Xue and Patrick T. Harker, have 
determined that this relationship offers numerous 
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parameters by which to assess the participation of the 
parties involved. These parameters include the 
infrastructure and characteristics of the entities involved 
as well as any of the numerous aspects relating to the 
process by which the service is delivered. (Xue and Harker, 
2003)  Among these parameters are, (1) the level of 
customer participation or involvement, (2) customer/firm 
efficiency, (3) customer/firm performance (4) customer/firm 
infrastructure, (5) service quality, (6) demand function, 
and competition among firms performing the same service. 
(Hue and Harker, 2005: p.5) This ‘textbook’ description of 
co-production, which is currently in use throughout the 
fields of operations and management science, will serve as 
the framework by which the partnership between DoD and the 
U.S. defense industry will be discussed throughout this 
report. 
B. THE PROCESS 
Irrespective of the field that it is applied, co-
production is largely a description of the process by which 
a service is provided. In the context of U.S. defense, this 
underlying process is known as the Planning Programming 
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). “As the name 
suggests, PPBE consists of three forward-looking processes 
and one backward-looking phase, execution.”(Candreva, 2005: 
p.18) The objective of the process is to use top-level 
guidance, such as the National Security Strategy and 
National Military Strategy, to create a DoD budget that 
effectively equips military commanders with the optimal mix 
of personnel and equipment required to meet the spectrum of 
military missions.  
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Although the defense budgeting processes had remained 
largely unchanged since the 1980s, improvements to the 
system were provided in May of 2003 with the signing of 
Management Initiative Decision (MID) 913 by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This initiative brought with 
it a two-year timeline as well as an increased emphasis on 
budget execution. The PPBE process combined two, two-year 
sequential cycles, in order to fit the timeline of the 
budgetary process within the constraints of a four-year 
Presidential term of office. In accordance with the new 
PPBE guidelines, off-years (odd-numbered years) would be 
used to assess program performance within DoD. The on-years 
(even-numbered years) would be reserved for internal 
components below the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) to develop and submit their POMs and Budget Estimate 
Decisions (BESs). It was envisioned that OSD would have 
sufficient time to complete full POM and BES in the on-
years, leaving the off-years for relatively minor 
modifications. The off-year modifications in the program 
and budget reviews were to consist of change proposals to 
the previous on-year submission. In addition to these 
adjustments, MID 913 brought about more changes in the PPBE 
process. First, the FY 2005 budget was established as a 
transitional year in which budgeting processes would remain 
adherent to prior year’s guidance. (DoD, 2003) 
Responsibilities and requirements set forth by Title 10 
were to remain unchanged as well. (DoD, 2003) The Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was to remain the chief 
military advisor to the SECDEF on all budgetary matters. 
(DoD, 2003) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
(USD(C)) and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation 
(DPA&E) were to provide supervisory guidance. (DoD, 2003) 
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In addition to these changes, performance in programming 
and execution received greater emphasis. PPBE participants 
were directed to improve the collection and management of 
data for use in performance metrics. Cost modeling and 
performance metrics were also emphasized to assist in 
allocation decisions. (DoD, 2003) 
In addition to adding congruence with the presidential 
timeline, “the two-year PPBE process more closely aligned 
DoD’s internal cycle with external requirements embedded in 
statute and administration policy.”(DoD/MID 913, 2003, p.3) 
These changes were aimed at facilitating DoD’s tasks of 
strategy development, resource planning and allocation, 
acquisition, and other decision processes. The changes that 
resulted from the PPBE process are summarized below by the 
SECDEF: 
 Year 1: Review and Refinement 
· Early National Security Strategy 
· Restricted fiscal guidance 
· Off-year DPG, as required (tasking studies indicative of new 
administration’s priorities; incorporating fact-of-life acquisition 
changes, completed PDM studies, and congressional changes) 
· Limited changes to baseline program 
· Program, budget, and execution review initializes the on-year DPG 
· President’s budget and congressional justification 
 Year 2: Full PPBE Cycle – Formalizing the Agenda 
· Quadrennial Defense Review 
· Issuance of fiscal guidance 
· On-year DPG (implementing QDR) 
· POM / BES submissions 
· Program, Budget, and Execution review 
· President’s budget and congressional justification 
 Year 3: Execution of Guidance 
· Restricted financial guidance 
· Off-year DPG, as required (tasking studies; incorporating fact-of-life 
acquisition program changes, PDM studies and congressional changes) 
· Limited changes to baseline program 
· Program, budget, and execution review initializes the on-year DPG 
· President’s budget and congressional justification 
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 Year 4: Full PPBE Cycle – Ensuring the Legacy 
· issuance of fiscal guidance 
· On-year DPG (refining alignment of strategy and programs) 
· POM / BES submissions 
· Program, budget, and execution review 
· President’s budget and congressional justification   
(From: DoD/MID 913, 2003) 
 The interaction of the PPBE processes and their 
associated inputs and outputs are illustrated in the 
following figure: 
 
Figure 1.   PPBE: The Big Picture (From: Rendon, 2005: 
Slide 18) 
 
C. CONGRESS AND PUBLIC POLICY CO-PRODUCTION 
 Although the PPBES framework illustrates how the 
process works, the major system drivers are the key 
stakeholders involved. Clearly, DoD and the defense 
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third major stakeholding group however, the U.S. Congress, 
clearly bears the predominant and most pervasive role in 
the trinity that is often commonly referred to as the “Iron 
Triangle”.  
 The tremendous influence that Congress wields in its 
relationship with DoD and the defense industrial base is 
derived from the authority that it has been granted by the 
U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 8 grants the 
legislative branch power over the authorization process. 
Explicitly, Congress is granted the power:  
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation 
of money to that use shall be for a longer term 
than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; 
To make rules for the government and regulation 
of the land and naval forces; To provide for 
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of 
the union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the militia, and for governing such 
part of them as may be employed in the service of 
the United States, reserving to the states 
respectively, the appointment of the officers, 
and the authority of training the militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress;  
(U.S. Constitution, 1776: Article 1, Section 8) 
 
 In accordance with Article 1, Section 9, “No money 
shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of 
appropriations made by law.” (U.S. Constitution, 1776: 
Article 1, Section 9) Indeed, the “power of the purse” that 
the legislative branch has over the authorization and 
appropriation of funds not only for defense, but the entire 
range of domestic programs, allows it to ultimately shape 
the national security infrastructure through the careful 
manipulation of public policy. This type of influence, 
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referred to as defense policy co-production, has become a 
cornerstone of the capital budgeting process. The clearest 
examples of this come in the form of what are called 
congressional “add-ons.” According to Hellman:  
Congressional add-ons to annual spending bills 
are generally characterized as efforts by members 
of Congress to funnel federal dollars into their 
home states or to fund pet projects, and this is 
very often the case. This practice, which is 
pervasive and has a long history, is considered 
to be a fundamental part of an elected official’s 
job description. In fact, politicians who fail to 
secure significant federal contracts for their 
districts—who don’t “bring home the bacon”—may 
find this failure becomes a re-election issue. 
(Hellman, 2000: p.1)  
 With regard to national defense spending, legislative 
add-ons appear to be more the rule than the exception. For 
instance in Fiscal Year 2001 Congress added “$5.1 billion” 
to the President’s budget request. (Hellman, 2000: p.1) Of 
this amount, $3.3 billion was added by the House or Senate 
for unrequested programs. (Hellman, 2000)  The private, 
non-partisan, non-profit organization, Citizens Against 
Government Waste (CAGW) found that the number of projects 
determined to be pork “jumped 25 percent from 2,077 in 
fiscal 2004 to 2,606 in fiscal 2005 while the total cost 
jumped 10.5 percent from $11.5 billion to $12.7 billion.” 
(CAGW, 2005)  The following table provides highlights of 
some of CAGW’s findings with regard to the fiscal year 2005 
defense appropriation.  
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Member House/Senate Party State Amount  Projects
Daniel Inouye Senate Democrat HI $33,900,000 Maui Space Surveillance System
Daniel Inouye Senate Democrat HI $23,000,000 Hawaii Federal Health Care Network
Daniel Inouye Senate Democrat HI $7,000,000 Center for Excellence for Research in Ocean Sciences
Ted Stevens Senate Republican AK $27,200,000 Alaska Land Mobile Research
Ted Stevens Senate Republican AK $7,375,000 Port of Anchorage Intermodal Marine Facility
Ted Stevens Senate Republican AK $5,500,000 High Frequency Auroral Research Program
Jerry Lewis House Republican CA $4,250,000 Norton Air Force Base (Closed in 1992)
Kay Bailey-
Hutchison          
Mike DeWine
Senate       
Senate
Republican          
Republican
TX    
OH $4,200,000 Academic Center for Aging Aircraft
Bill Frist Senate Republican TN $4,000,000 Clarksville-Montgomery County School System
Dianne Feinsetin Senate Democrat CA $1,000,000 Griffith Observatory
 
Table 1.   Spending Add-ons to the 2005 Defense 
Appropriation (From: CAGW  
 
 Despite the negative perception that the term “pork” 
conjures in the minds of political officials and pundits, 
not all legislative add-ons are for unnecessary programs or 
items. For instance, the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense 
Appropriation included $200 million in unrequested funds to 
improve prescription drug benefits for military retirees. 
(Hellman, 2000)  Another example is provided by the Fiscal 
Year 2000 Defense Appropriation Act which authorized ship 
construction that the Navy did not request. In what has 
been attributed to the “persuasive powers” of then Senate 
Majority Leader, Trent Lott, Congress appropriated $375 
million to begin construction of the multi-purpose 
amphibious assault ship, LHD-8 which was to be built at the 
Litton-Ingalls shipyard in the Senators home state of 
Mississippi. (Prina, 2000)  
 Another example of the influence of Congressional 
funding authority involves the U.S. National Guard prior to 
2001. According to Hellman:  
Because the Guard, during peacetime, comes under 
control of the individual states and not the 
federal government (they have to be federalized 
by the President in times of war or during states 
of emergency), the Pentagon includes only modest 
funding for the Guard in its annual budget 
requests. They know that Governors and state 
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Guard commanders will contact their congressional 
delegations and that the money will be added. And 
in fact, [prior to 2001] Congress [added] roughly 
$600 million to the Pentagon budget each year for 
the Guard and Reserve. (Hellman, 2000: p.2) 
 Although fiscal control affords Congress tremendous 
power, it is not the only defense stakeholder to actively 
use the policy aspect of co-production to achieve its aims. 
Indeed, in recent years senior DoD officials have exercised 
increasing influence over the budgeting process. (Hellman, 
2000) Prior to Fiscal Year 1997, representatives of the 
CJCS testified before Congress that the levels of funding 
were adequate to meet the requirements of the day. Since 
then they have lobbied Congress heavily for additional 
funding. (Hellman, 2000) By 2000 it was evident that DoD 
had found the means of using the nuances of the budgeting 
process to increase its own funding level. From Hellman:  
[JCS’s] long-term budget requests, delivered to 
[then] Defense Secretary Cohen in June [2000], 
called for additional spending of as much as $30 
billion annually for most of the next decade. By 
definition these documents, known as Program 
Objective Memoranda (POMs), are intended to 
reflect spending levels set for the services by 
the Administration. However, statements by 
representatives of the JCS indicate that while 
recent increases in military spending have been 
well received by the Service Chiefs, the POMs 
reflect their belief that significantly greater 
resources need to be made available in the 
immediate future. (Hellman, 2000: p.4)  
 This reflects a disagreement between the military and 
civilian leadership in DoD over how much is enough. Hellman 
says:  
The decision by the JCS to disregard the funding 
levels set by the Pentagon’s civilian leadership 
in preparing the POM reflects a continuation of 
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the recent trend by the nation’s military—with 
the help of Congress—to circumvent normal 
budgetary procedures. (Hellman, 2000: p.4) 
 Beginning in the Fall of 2001, the war on terrorism 
has changed this picture. Add-ons to defense spending have 
come in the form of supplementals. Supplementals were 
originally used by Congress as a means of providing funding 
for urgent national emergencies. Since the surprise 
terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the ensuing 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq however, they have been 
become an unofficial plus-up for the Pentagon’s budget. 
From Fiscal Years 1997 through 2001 defense supplementals 
amounted to over $30 billion. (Hellman, 2000)  Clearly, 
annual defense supplementals have become more the rule than 
the exception. As the following table shows, supplemental 
defense appropriations amounted to billions of dollars from 
fiscal years 2003 through 2005. Consistent with this trend, 
the House version of the 2006 defense authorization bill 
currently includes $49 billion in supplemental defense 
funding. (Babcock, 2005)  
Fiscal Year Amount ($ billions) 
2003 79 (1) 
2004 25 (2) 
2005 82 (3) 
2006 49 (4) 
 
Table 2.   Defense Supplemental Appropriations, FY 
2003-2005 (From: (4)Babcock,2005; (1)CQ, 2004; 
(2)Farrell, 2004; (3)Miles, 2005) 
 
 The current view of Congress on defense co-production 
was provided by Michigan Senator Carl Levin in a hearing 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 
2005. Using the 2006 Defense Authorization and Future Years 
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Defense Program Request as a backdrop, the Senator made the 
following statement:  
Our troops are doing all that we ask of them and 
more. Our collective responsibility is to give 
them the training and the tools and the personnel 
to do the things that we ask them to do. Our 
forces are stretched very thin, and we should not 
be asking them to perform tasks that could and 
should be done in whole or in part by the people 
of Iraq and Afghanistan and by other countries. 
It is our job here in the Senate, just as it is 
Secretary Rumsfeld's and General Myers' job, to 
do our best to address our national security 
needs and the needs of our troops both here and 
now, and to think long term and prepare for the 
challenges ahead. At the same time our forces are 
engaged in combat, we must continue the task of 
transforming our forces for the future. 
We have before us both a fiscal year 2005 
supplemental submitted this week to address the 
here and now issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
a budget request for fiscal year 2006 submitted 
last week that must address those longer-term 
issues. Part of our collective challenge is not 
to lose sight of those long-term issues despite 
the considerable time and attention that we all 
must devote to the situation on the ground in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Responsible budgeting means making choices and 
setting priorities. This budget request fails 
that test, because it doesn't include funds for 
things that we know will have to be paid for. 
There are programs that we all know that the 
Defense Department needs and will have to be 
funded in 2006 that are not in this budget 
request -- such as the cost of the extra 30,000 
Army personnel and the 3,000 Marine Corps that 
Congress authorized last year. Yet there are no 
funds in this '06 budget to pay for that. Instead 
it is left for the '06 supplemental, which 




 A study of defense policy co-production is incomplete 
without mention of the role of the defense industry. As one 
of the influential members of the iron triangle, the 
private sector is clearly aware of power of Congressional 
influence. Representatives from the industry’s leading 
firms, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and 
Boeing continually attempt to lobby members of the House 
and Senate in order to influence programs that stand to 
yield billions of dollars annually. The political officials 
stand to gain political influence with their constituents 
and ultimately re-election. Any means of facilitating this 
transaction becomes keenly important. For this reason, a 
factor as simple as the proximity between the legislators 
and industry members becomes critical. For instance, firms 
located near the Capitol have benefited substantially. The 
Maryland based firms Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman 
were “first” and “third” in 2004 in the amount of annual 
contract awards, with “$20.7 and $11.9 billion” 
respectively. (Associated Press, 2005) 
 Although it is often to a lesser extent, ideological 
proximity to members of Congress is of great importance as 
well. Indeed, one of the contributing influences on defense 
policy co-production by the legislative branch and the 
private sector is the extent of military service of key 
legislators. In a study of four separate shipbuilding 
programs, including the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Mine 
Countermeasures Ship (MCM-1), Amphibious Transport Dock 
(LPD-17), and Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-51), it was 
determined that military experience had a clear effect on 
defense appropriations and ultimately determined the flow 
of billions of dollars to the defense industry in the form 
of major defense programs. According to Herty: 
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Military experience does appear to have an effect 
on votes for defense appropriations. However, 
this experience has a greater impact on committee 
actions than it does on House and Senate floor 
voting actions. Prior military experience may 
make some members more inclined to give a defense 
program its needed dollars. A lack of military 
experience may make others less inclined to 
support DoD programs. However, the actual 
location where a defense program’s unit is built 
will be a much greater determinant of the 
appropriations dollars that the program receives. 
(Herty, 2004: p.41) 
 Often in recent years the defense industry’s influence 
on legislative policy has been much less subtle. One of the 
most controversial programs in recent years, involved the 
Air Force’s plan to recapitalize its aging fleet of aerial 
refueling tankers with aircraft from defense aerospace 
industry giant Boeing. According to a non-partisan, 
campaign finance research group, Boeing spent millions of 
dollars on lobbyists and contributions to federal campaigns 
in order to influence political officials with influence 
over the transaction. (Birnbaum, 2004)  
B. CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the manipulation of public policy is an 
important of aspect of defense co-production. Whether 
manipulating elements of the budgeting process, or 
exploiting strengths and weaknesses inherent to the major 
stakeholders, the provision of national security by the 
public and private sector is as much a product of policy as 
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III. DEFENSE CO-PRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At its core, a study of U.S. defense co-production 
involves an analysis of the cooperative and dynamic 
relationship that has evolved between the military 
establishment and the private defense industry. Although 
this union has experienced changing dimensions and has been 
subject to the political and budgetary influences of the 
day, its foundation has remained in placed since the nation 
acquired its independence. (Gansler, 1980)  
The objective of this chapter to examine the evolution 
of defense co-production since the second World War in 
order to provide the historical perspective necessary for 
discussion of the current state of affairs. In addition, 
insights gained will serve as tools to facilitate the 
understanding of how recent changes are likely to influence 
defense co-production in the future. 
B. PRE-COLD WAR PERIOD  
 A clear conclusion that may be drawn from an analysis 
of the provision of national defense is that the 
relationship between the public and private sector has been 
cyclical in nature. Described on the basis defense 
spending, the dimensions of the market and levels of 
funding have tended to increase sharply in pre-war and war 
time periods, and fall drastically in post-war periods. As 
a result of this duality, what has developed has been 
defined as ‘peace-time’ and ‘war time’ spending.  One of 
the major reasons for this phenomenon is the authoritative 
influence that the legislative branch exerts over the 
budgeting and execution process. Exercising its 
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constitutionally granted oversight to ensure visibility and 
accountability, transactions between the public sector and 
defense industry, simply do not proceed without the 
authority of Congress. The ‘power of the purse’ remains the 
driving forces behind the process. The era preceding the 
Cold War was no different in this respect.  
 Although the relationship between Congress, DoD, and 
the defense industry may often be described as contentious, 
military procurement throughout the period of World War Two 
is generally considered to have been successful. As 
described by McNaugher, “If the nation’s procurement 
process worked phenomenally well during World War II, it 
was not because the political system somehow came to terms 
with the technical enterprise afoot but rather because 
wartime urgency encouraged Congress to relax traditional 
concerns with access and accountability.” (McNaugher, 1989: 
p.17) 
 Underlying this success, the nation’s experience in 
World War I had clearly demonstrated to the civilian and 
military leadership that it was not enough to simply 
possess immense production capacity in the private sector, 
but that it was vitally important to have established plans 
in place to ensure that this capability could be quickly 
and effectively mobilized when the need arose. (Terry, 
1990) Although the problems experienced during the 
first World War did not stem from a dearth in funding 
support, the lack of planning resulted in the need to 
borrow essential war supplies from the French and British 
to sustain the force. (Terry, 1990) In an effort to 
avert such contingencies in the future, the U.S. moved 
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quickly to erect the infrastructure necessary to mobilize 
its own product assets. 
 World War I had also given the civilian and military 
leadership a glimpse at what was believed to be the state 
of warfare in modern era. Although the U.S. homeland was 
untouched by the ravages of the conflict, the war was no 
less draining or resource intensive to the nation at large. 
Planners correctly realized that wars of the future would 
be “total wars”, requiring the focused and collective 
effort of not only the military components but also the 
defense industry to prosecute the national security 
objectives. (Terry, 1990)  This reasoning was the impetus 
for the increased industrial output prior to World War II. 
As Terry explains: 
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States was 
already “gearing up” for a fight. The “Arsenal of 
Democracy” was involved in providing equipment to 
belligerents before the first bullet was fired in 
anger at a United States’ serviceman. When the 
United States entered World War II, the 
industrial base required a lead time to increase 
production rates. However, lead time was probably 
shortened somewhat by our acceleration of 
material support to the Allies in 1939 and 1940, 
and our own preparations. The United States was 
able to influence nations on a global scale 
because of its global capabilities during the 
war. (Terry, 1990: p.6) 
 It is clear that recognizing the importance of the 
defense industry as an enabling factor behind national 
security was important not only to the Allied victory in 
World War II but critical to the establishment of the 
United States as the preeminent Western “super power”. This 
symbiotic relationship was strengthened and further refined 
following the World War era. 
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B. COLD WAR PERIOD  
Defense co-production during the Cold War era evolved 
as function of the tenuous national security environment. 
The seemingly imminent confrontation with the Soviet Union 
and the greater communist ideology resulted in a level of 
acquisition from the private sector that far exceeded 
peacetime levels. (McNaugher, 1989)  One of the major areas 
for growth during this period was technology. The military 
and political leadership looked to the private sector to 
provide (in greater volume) the systems which had proven to 
be highly effective during the war effort. Radars, 
computers, communication systems received increasing 
priority. In addition, increasingly complex weapon systems 
such as the B-29 and B-50 bombers and the guided munitions 
that were developed during this time further fueled this 
technological boom. (McNaugher, 1989) The urgent shift in 
priorities was clearly evident by DoD’s spending on 
emerging technologies like the guided missile. “Defense 
Department funding for guided missiles rose from a meager 
0.5 percent in 1951 of funding for research, development, 
and production to 8.2 percent in 1956 and then sharply 
upward to 23.2 percent in 1959.” (McNaugher, 1989: p.30) 
One of the most significant changes in the DoD / 
defense industry relationship during the Cold War time 
period was the increased emphasis on research and 
development. This shift represented a major departure from 
the production focus that had consumed the nation for most 
of the previous decade. America’s victories throughout the 
world war era had required unprecedented levels of 
production. For instance, over the course of World War II 
DoD had relied on the defense industry for the annual 
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provision of roughly “50,000 aircraft, 20,000 tanks, 80,000 
artillery pieces, and 500,000 trucks.” (DoD, 2005: p.1) 
Additionally, “war production as a percentage of total 
Gross National Product (GNP), rose from 2 percent to 44 
percent between 1939 and 1944.” (DoD, 2005: p.1)  The sharp 
downturn in demand for defense materiel following the war 
led many of the leading companies in the defense industry 
to diversify into other markets in order to leverage the 
technical competencies that they had accrued. In 
particular, aerospace companies, which had come to rely 
heavily on DoD for the acquisition of fighter and bomber 
aircraft, expanded into advanced electronics and guided 
weapon systems. (McNaugher, 1989)  Indeed, by 1959 these 
aerospace firms had come to represent “over 75 percent of 
the Defense Department’s important contracts.” (McNaugher, 
1989: p.32)  Unlike the previous decades however, the 
majority of these contracts were not for production, but 
rather for research and development. For instance, during 
the Korean War era, production represented nearly 90 
percent of General Electric’s defense contracts. By the 
early 1960s however, research and development accounted for 
the lion’s share of its business representing nearly 71 
percent of North American Aviation sales. (Stekler and 
McNaugher, 1989)   
  This transition was not limited to one firm. The 
increased emphasis on research and development pervaded the 
defense industry at large. The result of this was an 
evolution in the relationship between the private sector 
and the military establishment. This trend was particularly 
characteristic of the defense aerospace industry. As noted 
by McNaugher:  
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Defense work was becoming more specialized; there 
was no commercial market for intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Meanwhile, commercial 
aviation was growing more slowly than the 
military market. Military sales were always 
important to the nation’s aircraft industry, but 
by the late 1950s the traditional aircraft—now 
largely aerospace—firms depended on the military 
for 67 percent (Beech Aircraft) to 99.2 percent 
of their business (Martin).  
(McNaugher, 1989: p.32) 
Defense co-production during the Cold War did not 
proceed without challenges for both the private sector and 
the public defense establishment. Despite the massive 
growth that the defense industry experienced throughout the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, the percentage of the national 
budget devoted to defense began a gradual and persistent 
decline. As the funding available for new procurement 
became increasingly scarce, the rate of acquisition of 
expensive weapon systems decreased substantially. For 
instance, “the United States bought about 3,000 tactical 
military aircraft per year in the 1950s, about 1,000 per 
year in the 1960s, and about 300 per year in the 1970s.” 
(Gansler, 1980: p.20-21)   As a result, it became evident 
throughout the defense industry that although dependence on 
DoD would remain a permanent and important aspect of its 
business their revenues would have to be buoyed by the 
subsidiary civilian industries that their efforts had given 
birth to. The private sector fields that were most affected 
by these changes included, jet aircraft, nuclear power, 
communications, and computer technology. (Gansler, 1980)  
During this juncture DoD was coming to terms with the 
same funding and procurement challenges that the defense 
industry was coping with while facing what seemed to be an 
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imminent confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although 
defense spending as a percentage of GNP was decreasing in 
the United States this was not the case in the Soviet 
Union. From Gansler: 
The Soviets were estimated to be spending 12 percent 
of their gross national product on defense (compared 
with six percent for the United States) and were 
building up their forces and increasing expenditures 
for research and development while America was 
spending less and less. By the end of the 1970s the 
Soviets were estimated to be spending 50 percent more 
on military outlays than the United States. Even by 
1974, the Soviet Union appeared to have more systems 
fielded and more coming off the production lines than 
the United States…The Soviet Union’s military systems 
were frequently on par with, and in some cases better 
than, those of the United States. With comparable 
quality, numbers of systems became more important; 
however, not enough procurement dollars were being 
allocated to U.S. defense. (Gansler, 1980: p.22) 
 The emergence of the Soviet threat and the weakened 
military and political position of the United States 
following the Vietnam War resulted in substantial increases 
in defense spending. According to Schneider and Merle: 
Coming out of the Vietnam War, the defense industry 
was much as it had been since World War II, with 
scores of companies competing for work, but Pentagon 
budgets declined. Stores of weapons had been depleted 
by the war and not replaced. The companies were 
venturing into new areas of innovation—such as radar-
evading stealth technology…Reagan came along and 
brought such programs to life with an infusion of 
money. Defense spending hit a peak of $456.5 billion 
in 1987 (in projected 2005 dollars), compared with 
$325.1 billion in 1980 and $339.6 million in 1981, 
according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments. Most of the increase was for procurement 
and research and development programs. The procurement 
budget leapt to $147.3 billion from $71.2 billion in 
1980. (Schneider and Merle, 2005: p.2) 
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 The Cold War era clearly demonstrated the benefits and 
perils of the growing interdependence between the military 
establishment and the defense industry. By the end of this 
period it was evident that the co-production of national 
defense would yield long-term effects not only on the 
principal participants but on the nation’s economy and 
domestic priorities as well. 
C. THE POST COLD WAR DRAWDOWN 
 Defense co-production in the wake of the Cold War was 
clearly a product of the dynamic national security 
environment that existed. The dissolution of the Soviet 
block yielded the prevailing belief that the most 
significant threat to U.S. national security had expired 
with it. As a result of this perceived “peace dividend”, 
defense spending in the years immediately following the 
Cold War exhibited significant reductions. The tremendous 
quantities of military equipment purchased from the 1980s 
through the 1991 Persian Gulf War enabled a 
recapitalization of the force in the early 1990s. (Cohen, 
1997) This recapitalization, in conjunction with the 
retirement of obsolete aircraft, armored vehicles, and war 
ships during this period led to what is now referred to as 
the defense “drawdown”. (Cohen, 1997)   
 The funding reductions, derived largely by trimming 
procurement accounts, had significant effects on the 
private sector and its relationship with DoD. Within the 
defense industry, consolidation was rampant as firms 
scrambled to compete for dwindling funds. Industry icons 
such as Lockheed, Martin, Northrop, and Grumman united more 
for long-term survival than for short-term profitability. 
(Wiedenbaum, 1997) By 1997, mergers and acquisitions among 
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the major defense-oriented firms reached approximately $70 
billion. (Wiedenbaum, 1997)  “During this restructuring, 
the aerospace industry workforce declined from a peak of 
1.33 million in 1989 to 806,000 in 1996, a decrease of 39 
percent. Coincidentally, the Department of Defense 
estimates a 39 percent [during this period].” (Wiedenbaum, 
1997: p.3)  
 The post Cold War period exposed other impediments for 
defense co-production. Although defense funding had been 
perpetually at odds with other domestic priorities and 
requirements it had become apparent by the end of the 1990s 
that the increase in entitlement outlays (largely a result 
of the nation’s aging population) would pose a significant 
long-term challenge for DoD procurement. (Wiedenbaum, 1997) 
This trend is readily apparent when looking at the changes 
in mandatory and discretionary spending since the 1960s. 
The following figure illustrates this point: 
 
 
Table 3.   Mandatory vs. Discretionary Spending, 1960-
2004  
(From: Candreva, 2004: p.15) 
 
 As a result of the fiscal realities and emerging 
asymmetrical threat, DoD began to implement specific top-
down changes in its relationship with the private sector. 
These measures were officially revealed within the 1997 
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Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Former Secretary of 
Defense William S. Cohen detailed the DoD plan to 
reorganize its infrastructure to more closely emulate the 
private sector as means of ensuring national security in 
the 21st Century. (Cohen, 1997) One of the measures that the 
Department planned to emphasize was what it referred to as 
the “overhaul” of the defense acquisition system. According 
to Cohen, many of these changes have already begun to reap 
rewards. From the 1997 QDR:  
The Department has already has made much progress 
already in overhauling the defense acquisition 
system—with full support from Congress. Those 
efforts are already paying significant dividends, 
permitting us to get far more for each dollar we 
spend than previously. (Cohen, 1997: p.9)              
  
 Beyond merely changing its acquisition policies DoD 
launched a concerted effort to better exploit the resources 
of the private sector. The department determined that these 
changes could only be realized by determining which defense 
activities could be outsourced and which activities had to 
remain in the public domain. Beyond this, the Department 
addressed co-production directly by stating its intention 
to remove many of the constrictive acquisition policies 
that had grown antiquated since the Cold War.  From the 
1997 QDR:                
We are examining the best opportunities to 
outsource and privatize non-core activities, but 
many of those opportunities are restrained by 
regulations and practices built up by the Cold 
War. We need to deregulate defense just as we 
have deregulated many other American industries 
so we can reap the cost and creativity benefits 
of wide-open private competition.       
(Cohen, 1997: p.9) 
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 To facilitate the infrastructure changes afoot 
throughout DoD, the Defense Reform Task Force was created 
to thoroughly examine the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, DoD agencies, field activities, and components to 
identify areas that could streamlined and consolidated 
through changes to the infrastructure. (Cohen, 1997) 
 Clearly, the co-production of national defense has 
faced tremendous challenges since World War II. Changes in 
domestic priorities, acquisition policies, and funding 
levels have all had a significant impact on how national 
security is provided. The most important and utterly 
unpredictable challenge however has been the emergence of a 
new enemy threat. The horrific terrorist attacks on the 
United States in September 2001 marked the beginning of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The uncertainties of this 
confrontation have made it clear that the nation’s ability 
to utilize its public and private sector assets will become 
increasingly important as the nation continues to combat 
the elusive and asymmetrical threat.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 In this chapter, major junctures in the evolution of 
defense co-production were examined. The relationship 
between DoD and the defense industrial base has been 
greatly influenced by fiscal constraints and the need to 
maintain capabilities that are commensurate with meeting 
both current and emerging threats.  The following chapter 
will examine the key trends that this dynamic national 
security environment has helped to create. 
28 
 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
29 
IV. TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS IN DEFENSE CO-
PRODUCTION 
A. CHANGING PRIORITIES 
1. Providing a Capabilities-Based Defense 
The co-production of defense by private industry and 
the military has created an increasingly symbiotic 
relationship between the principal players. As previously 
discussed, trends in defense acquisition closely follow and 
reflect the prevailing military strategy. Concordantly, 
DoD’s capability requirements are communicated through the 
top-level guidance that it receives and issues. Among these 
strategic documents is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
that provides a four-year summary of current defense 
strategy and requirements. Published September 30, 2001, 
the current QDR addresses two key principles that are 
believed to be essential pillars for assuring the nation’s 
security now and in the future. The first of these 
principles is capabilities-based strategy. This approach 
represents a departure from the threat-based paradigm that 
drove U.S. defense planning and acquisition for most of the 
20th century. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of 
the monolithic Soviet threat has not yielded the windfall 
of global security that some had foreseen. On the contrary, 
the proliferation of global terrorism culminating in terror 
attacks on the U.S. homeland in September 2001 indicate 
that threat has become more dispersed, asymmetrical, less 
discretely defined. For this reason capabilities and 
requirements determination will remain a dynamic and 
forward-looking process. As discussed by Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “It is not enough to plan for 
large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the 
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United States must identify the capabilities required to 
deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, 
deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their 
objectives.” (ODR, 2001: p.IV) 
This capabilities approach has proven to be congruent 
with DoD’s joint paradigm as well. An outflow of the shift 
in strategic thinking was the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS replaced 
the antiquated Requirements Generation System (RGS) with a 
process intended to yield: (1) a broader review of 
capabilities, (2) improved coordination with other 
departments, (3) enhanced methodology to identify and to 
describe capabilities gaps (4) better definition of non-
material aspects of material solutions (5) prioritized 
capability gaps and proposals, and (6) engagement of the 
acquisition community and defense contractor earlier in the 
process. (Rendon, 2005) This final measure will serve to 
further expand the extent of defense co-production by DoD 
and the private sector. 
In addition to procedural changes, the JCIDS brings 
with it specific analysis processes that have already begun 
to influence the acquisition of weapon systems. One of 
these processes is Functional Solution Analysis. Following 
analyses of both the Functional Area and Functional need, 
this process was designed to facilitate a review of all of 
the services in order to determine whether a gap in 
capability may be filled with assets already within the DoD 
arsenal. For instance, before beginning the expensive and 
timely process of acquiring a new radar-evading Navy 
aircraft, the assets of the other services will be 
thoroughly reviewed to determine whether the need truly 
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exists. If it is determined that an Air Force aircraft can 
resolve the capability deficit acquisition of the Navy’s 
aircraft will be halted. This conservative and frugal 
process has already begun to influence system acquisition 
particularly at the service level. One of the early victims 
was the Army’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter. Originally 
slated to enter production in 2006, the Army’s replacement 
for the aging OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1 Cobra, was officially 
canceled in February 2004. Although DoD had already spent 
$8 billion of a planned $30 billion on the aircraft, it was 
determined that in light of more pressing budgetary 
concerns (e.g. ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), 
the Comanche did not provide a significant marginal benefit 
over other assets already fielded and in use. According to 
John Pike, director of the defense research group, 
“GlobalSecurity.org”, “[The Comanche’s] mission was to 
scout the field and to attack, but we're scouting with UAVs 
(unmanned aerial vehicles) and we've got lots of other ways 
to shoot at tanks now." (Dunham/Emery 2004: p.1)  
B. TRANSFORMATION YIELDS INCREASED OUTSOURCING BY DOD 
The second major principle of the current QDR is 
transformation. This has been described as a means of 
enabling and executing the capabilities based movement 
already afoot throughout DoD. According to Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld:  
Adopting this capabilities-based approach to 
planning requires that the nation maintain its 
military advantages in key areas while it 
develops new areas of military advantage and 
denies asymmetric advantages to adversaries…In 
short, it requires the transformation of U.S. 
forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend 
America’s asymmetric advantages well into the 
future. (QDR, 2001: p.IV) 
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One of the strategies by which DoD intends to realize 
the benefits of transformation is by changing many of its 
well-established processes to more closely resemble that of 
the private sector. One of the prime objectives of DoD’s 
business transformation is to greatly reduce the complexity 
of the military. Institutional changes, such as increased 
emphasis on the execution phase of the planning, 
programming and budgeting process have greatly streamlined 
one of DoD’s most time and resource intensive operations.  
1. Increased Role for Private Industry 
 The institutional changes sweeping through DoD have 
had a major impact of how national defense is provided. 
Much of this is directly attributable to transformation. 
DoD has changed its paradigm to focus its limited resources 
on what it considers to be its core function, warfighting. 
As a result, subsidiary functions that were once considered 
within purview of the military have been pushed from its 
domain to the defense industry. In essence, DoD has 
endeavored to exploit the strengths of the private sector 
to supplement the provision of the nation’s defense. This 
objective is evident based upon the QDR. It states:  
DoD will assess all its functions to separate 
core and non-core functions. The test will be 
whether a function is directly necessary for 
warfighting. The review will divide these 
functions into three broad categories:   
. Functions directly linked to warfighting are 
best performed by the federal government. In 
these areas, DoD will invest in process and 
technology to improve performance.  
. Functions indirectly linked to warfighting 
capability that must be shared by the public and 
private sectors. In these areas, DoD will seek to 
define new models of public-private partnerships 
to improve performance.  
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. Functions not linked to warfighting and best 
performed by the private sector. In these areas, 
DoD will seek to privatize or outsource entire 
functions or define new mechanisms for 
partnerships with private firms or other public 
agencies. (QDR, 2001: p.53-54)   
 Clearly, the co-production of defense is a trend that 
has become increasingly prominent. More than ever before, 
aspects of the nation’s security have become have become 
the prime deliverables of private sector companies with 
specific defense-oriented core competencies. 
2. History of Contractor Support 
Despite the recent attention that security outsourcing 
has received, the partnership between the military and the 
private sector to provide the nation’s defense is not an 
entirely new concept. Indeed, the provision of security by 
these principal parties has existed officially for much of 
the nation’s history. Beyond simply providing weapon 
systems, the private sector has fulfilled a significant 
role in support of forces on and in close proximity to the 
battlefield as well. As early as the American Revolution 
civilians were hired to “drive wagons; provide 
architectural, engineering and carpentry services; obtain 
foodstuffs; and deliver medical services.” (Schenck, 2001: 
p.1) The evolution of contractor support may be viewed in 
two phases as Schenck recounts:  
From the Revolutionary War through World War I, 
the American military used contractors as 
suppliers of goods and transportation. Increased 
complexity of military aircraft, signal 
equipment, vehicles, and other hardware of World 
War II Korea brought technical representatives in 
increasing numbers to forward areas. Contractors 
evolved from suppliers of goods and transport to 
force multipliers. During Vietnam, the Army 
employed contractors as replacements for soldiers 
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to keep the Army under mandated troop ceilings 
set by the President. From Vietnam to Kosovo 
contractors [became] a strategic asset, an 
integral part of the U.S. Army’s warfighting and 
peacekeeping capability. They are no longer a 
mere rear area logistics resource. (Schenck, 
2001: p.4) 
   The following table is based on data originally 
gathered by Paula Rebar for the U.S. Army War College. In 
addition to providing a historical perspective on 
contractor employment, these findings make it apparent that 
the private sector has preserved a role for itself with 
regard to the co-production of national defense. 
War/Conflict Civilians/Contractors Military Ratio 
Civil War 200,000 (est.) 1,000,000 
1:5 
(est.) 
World War I 85,000 2,000,000 1:20 
World War II 734,000 5,540,000 1:7 
Korea 156,000 393,000 1:2.5 
Vietnam 70,000 359,000 1:5 
Gulf War 5,200 541,000 1:100 




Table 4.   Ratio of Civilians/Contractors to Military  
  Personnel by Conflict. (From: McBride, 2003: 
p.6) 
Current estimates presented in the Air Force Journal 
of Logistics suggest that there is “one civilian contractor 
for every ten military members” involved in OIF. (Blizzard, 
2004: p.1)  
3. Factors that have Contributed to Increased 
Outsourcing 
The transformational changes within DoD have renewed 
the attractiveness of outsourcing throughout the military. 
Beyond merely mimicking the processes and institutions of 
the private sector, circumstances have arisen which have 




 a. Increased Life-Cycle Procurement 
 A factor that has contributed to the growing 
reliance on contractors is the increased acquisition of 
systems that require contractor support for their entire 
operation life cycles. The increasing technical complexity 
and sophistication of many weapons has rendered the 
maintenance of such systems beyond the capabilities of the 
typical Sailor, Soldier, or Airman. As a result, the 
acquisition of a weapon system often includes a provision 
for support from the contractor from the time the system is 
fielded to its delivery, and ultimately for the duration of 
its useful life. The current arsenal is filled with major 
weapon systems that would be rendered inoperable without 
persistent contractor support. One high-profile weapon 
system that requires persistent contractor support to 
remain operational is the Army’s AH-64 Apache attack 
helicopter. When interviewed by representative from the 
General Accounting Office, members of the Army National 
Guard deployed to Bosnia conveyed that contractors were 
employed to maintain their Apache helicopters because the 
Guard had neither the resources nor expertise to perform 
what was considered to be intermediate maintenance. (GAO, 
2003) check alignment all the way through  
  Another weapon system that is highly dependant 
upon outside support is the Predator Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) in use by the Air Force in support of OIF. As 
noted by the GAO “when the Air Force deployed the 
Predator…it required contractor support because the vehicle 
[was] still in development and the Air Force [had] not 
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trained service members to maintain the Predator’s data 
link system.” (GAO, 2003: p.8)     
b. A Focus on Core Competencies 
The 2001 QDR’s discussion of transformation provides 
insight into one of the primary reasons for the increase in 
outsourcing. The public defense establishment has 
recognized that in light of shrinking funding levels it has 
become more important than ever to focus on its core 
warfighting competency in order to ensure the most 
efficient use of scarce resources. Beyond this, the robust 
employment of the military, particularly in recent years, 
has made support from the private sector a much more 
welcome proposition. The added costs necessary to sustain 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (estimated to exceed 
nearly $37 billion in fiscal year 2006), have made it 
essential that DoD receive the maximum warfighting output 
from each of its personnel. (Baker, 2005) Concordantly, 
subsidiary functions such as logistics, information 
technology, intelligence analysis, and others have been 
pushed to the private sector. To this end, the defense 
industry effectively serves as a force-multiplier. The 
firms involved provide critical defense-related services 
while DoD personnel are free to focus on warfighting. 
4. Categories of Co-Production Support 
In general, contractor support falls within three 
broad categories. These are: (1) systems support, (2) 
theater support, and (3) external support.  Systems 
support, as in the case of the AH-64 Apache helicopter and 
Predator (UAV) involve maintenance and many times 
operational assistance for weapons already in use by 
deployed forces. Theater support is generally awarded at 
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the combatant command level for the provision of “recurring 
services-such as equipment rental or repair, minor 
construction, security, and intelligence service or for the 
one time delivery of goods at the deployed location.” (GAO, 
2003: p.5)  Finally, external theater support covers basic 
infrastructure services that contractor are expected to 
continue even in the event of deployment services. (GAO, 
2003) These services are generally awarded by DoD agencies 
such as the Defense Logistics Agency or Army Corps of 
Engineers. (GAO, 2003) In order to more effectively exploit 
the assets of the private sector, the Army created the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in 1985 as a 
means of assuring the support of its forces both at home 
and abroad. (GAO, 2003) The following table, prepared by 
the GAO provides a clear indication of the diversity of 
support services that contractors continue to provide to 
deployed military units. As the table below indicates, 
contractors in Iraq are providing such services as weapons 
system support, intelligence analysis, logistics support, 
installation / personnel security, fuel and material 





Table 5.   “Selected Services Provided by Contractor in 
Deployed Locations” (From: GAO, 2003: p.7) 
 
C. THE PROLIFERATION OF THE CORPORATE MILITARY 
 Another significant trend that has emerged with regard 
to defense co-production is the growth and use of civilian 
contractors to fulfill roles that had once been considered 
strictly within the bounds of the uniformed services. Over 
the last two decades an entire industry has emerged to 
provide highly specialized services to deployed military 
forces. Although these services often involve mundane tasks 
ranging from food service, information technology support, 
and mail service, other roles such as private security, and 
the training of foreign troops and police have become 
increasingly controversial and have drawn greater scrutiny 
recently. These “Private Military Firms (PMFs)” as named by 
Brookings Institute analyst, Peter Singer, have experienced 
significant employment since the 1990s. This industry has 
experienced exponential growth with over ten times the 
number of contractors employed in the 2003 Iraq invasion 
than in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. (Van Dongen, 2003, p.2) 
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Although much of this growth may be attributed to the 
increased financial incentives for foreign infrastructure 
development, it is largely a result of a military that has 
become increasingly constrained with regard to its 
resources and personnel despite more robust employment. 
Private companies offering military services have emerged 
to help bridge some of these resource shortfalls. 
1. Origins 
 Although the many of the large military service 
companies such as DynCorp, Blackwater, and Booz-Allen 
Hamilton are based in the U.S., the contemporary industry 
model was conceived by a British military officer, Captain 
David Stirling. Stirling founded the Special Air Service in 
1941 as a highly trained unit specializing in 
unconventional warfare.  Following his military service, 
Stirling leveraged his military experience and expertise to 
start “the first 20th century private military company, 
Watchguard International, in 1967. The firm hired 
exclusively from the ranks of former military officers, 
particularly the SAS. Stirling’s firm was employed 
extensively to train the security forces of many of the 
Persian Gulf states (CMD, 2005) 
 Following Stirling’s example, former SAS officers, 
David Walker, and Arish Terle started the Control Risks 
Group in 1975. During the next two decades the burgeoning 
number of firms in the industry coupled with unscrupulous 
individuals like Mike Hoare and Bob Denard greatly 
tarnished the image of the fledgling industry. Hoare and 
Denard were linked to assassinations and the overthrow of 
governments.   
 The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a 
significant surge in both number of new private military 
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companies and the frequency of their employment. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union rendered many of the large 
standing armies equipped to repel the convention threat 
mismatched to the asymmetrical threats that were to emerge. 
As a result, millions of former soldiers began to offer 
their specialized services in the global market. (CMD, 
2005) 
 Although civilian contractors had been involved in 
military operations in previous conflicts, their employment 
in operations that had formerly been strictly limited to 
uniformed service members was receiving greater acceptance. 
In the West, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
initiated an effort to privatize government services. 
Similar measures were adopted by President Ronald Reagan 
and then Vice President George Bush who spearheaded efforts 
to complement the intelligence community with civilian 
contractors. Subsequently, during President Bush’s 
administration a contract in the amount of $8.9 million was 
awarded to Brown and Root Service (which would later become 
KBR) to generate a proposal detailing the measures 
necessary to more effectively integrate private contractors 
into military operations.  
 The Vietnam War had demonstrated that there was 
potential for a larger civilian role on the battlefield. 
The firm Pacific Architects and Engineers had performed 
many construction tasks that had formerly been reserved for 
the Army Corps of Engineers. Companies such as Halliburton 
and Vinnell provided extensive logistical support while 
firms such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Cubic 
continued to offer hardware for weapon systems, vehicle and 
simulators as well facilities maintenance, training and 
technology support services. (CMD, 2005)  
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 As a result of the significant drawdown in the U.S. 
military in the 1990s, one of the first domestic private 
military companies, Military Personnel Resources 
Incorporated (MPRI) was started. This was extensively 
employed in the Balkan conflict alongside industry veterans 
DynCorp and Halliburton. Unlike its peer companies which 
were hired for facilities maintenance, MPRI’s role was to 
provide specialized military training to the indigenous 
Croatian forces. (CMD, 2005)   
 Although domestic firms offering military services 
like MPRI, were employed extensively throughout the 1990s, 
the South African firm, Executive Outcomes, is credited 
with transforming the perception of the industry from that 
of mercenaries and “soldiers of fortune” to legitimate 
companies. This firm was created by Eben Barlow, a former 
assistant commander of the 32nd Battalion of the South 
African Defense Force (SADF).  This unit achieved an 
unparalleled reputation in the region and was highly 
decorated for its role in numerous conflicts in Southern 
Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In order to staff 
Executive Outcomes, Barlow aggressively recruited other 
former officers of the 32nd Battalion as well as other 
highly trained elite SADF units such as the Parachute 
Brigade and Reconnaissance Commandos. Barlow’s strategy for 
Executive Outcomes was to exploit the vast unutilized 
personnel resources (roughly ~ 60,000 soldiers) of the 
deposed Apartheid regime. Barlow was “an innovative 
military mind, whose genius lay in recognizing business 
opportunity and creating a new organization methodology of 
warfare.” (Singer, 2004, p.102) Of the greater than 90 
companies of the type operating in Africa throughout the 
1990s, Executive Outcomes was recognized as the largest, 
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capable of providing clients such as oil drilling and 
mineral extraction companies with greater than 1000 highly 
trained and heavily armed private soldiers. (CMD, 2005)  
 Although Executive Outcome’s extensive involvement in 
conflicts in Angola, Congo, and Sierra Leone were highly 
scrutinized and highly controversial (leading to the firm’s 
closure in 1989) many aspects of the company’s business 
model were adopted by the hundreds of companies that have 
followed and are still in practice by contemporary private 
military companies.  
These include: 
 . Special Forces Employee Base – Although Executive 
Outcomes was not the first private military companies to 
employ former military officers and troops it was the first 
to limit its applicant pool to a relatively homogeneous mix 
of SADF troops. In addition to ensuring the inflow of 
reputable soldiers of consistent quality and expertise, it 
ensured that all of its private soldiers possessed a 
compatible set of requisite skills and training. In 
addition, this hiring practice ensured a “pre-existing 
hierarchy, and extensive combat experience in low-intensity 
conflict and counter-insurgency operations. The company 
advertised that it had over 5000 years of combat 
experience, far more than most armies can claim.”(Singer, 
2004, p.103)  Similarly, companies such as Blackwater 
U.S.A., and KBR hire veterans of the U.S. Special Forces 
almost exclusively. The joint inter-service training that 
members of these units receive facilitates the use of their 
expertise by these private security firms. 
 Compensation – One of Executive Outcomes most 
effective measures for recruiting highly trained 
professional soldiers was through financial compensation. 
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Bearing tactical experience and marketable skills in 
weaponry, clandestine operations, allowed its private 
soldiers to earn between five and ten times more than their 
contemporaries in other African militaries above they could 
earn as federal employees. Throughout the 1990s Executive 
Outcomes offered salaries that ranged from “$2,000 to 
$13,000 per month (dependant upon experience and 
expertise). The average pay was about $3,500 a month for 
soldiers and, $4,000 for officers and $7,500 for air 
crews.” (Singer, 2004, p103)  
 Executive Outcomes was able to bring legitimacy to the 
fledgling industry by implementing two important measures. 
First, its employees were paid in U.S. currency. Although 
the other private regional armies offered high 
compensation, offering payment in U.S. dollars assured a 
more stable exchange rate for its soldiers. Second, 
Executive Outcomes was among the first firms of its type to 
go beyond financial compensation and offer full health 
insurance coverage and life insurance to all of its 
employees. (Singer, 2004, p.103) Despite the inherent risk 
associated with the profession, these benefits have become 
staples of the compensation packages being offered by 
contemporary private security companies such as KBR, Booz-
Allen Hamilton and Blackwater. 
 Decentralized Control – Despite the large number of 
private soldiers on its payroll, Executive Outcome did not 
possess a centralized troop facility from which to operate. 
The company’s only standing operation was a command center 
in Pretoria that served primarily as a 24-hour dispatch 
served for its dispersed assets. The firm relied upon an 
extensive database of soldiers that it could draw upon as 
required. This decentralized manning structure has 
44 
persisted from the 1990s today and continues to confound 
the efforts of those attempting to quantify the 
organization structure of many of the larger private 
military companies that exist today. 
 Contributing to the ambiguity surrounding Executive 
Outcomes’ organizational structure was the complicated 
architecture of its corporate network. Officially, the firm 
was a subsidiary of the South African venture capital 
conglomerate Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC) which 
owned other private security companies such as Lifeguard, 
Saracen, and Teleservices, which operated extensively in 
Angola and Uganda. These firms operated behind the patina 
of being ‘asset protection’ service companies for their 
many client states throughout Africa. These security firms 
would typically arrive in country at the conclusion of 
military operations in their client countries and enabled 
Executive Outcomes to establish longstanding footholds 
there. In addition, through the use of other SRC 
subsidiaries, such as Falconeer and Bridge International, 
the firm was able to expand the breadth of its regional 
network and solidify its presence in the host nations while 
claiming to offer innocuous engineering and logistics 
services long after the conclusion of hostilities. 
 Complicating matters even further was its purported 
association with the holding company, Branch Heritage Group 
based in London, England. This organization included 
“mining and oil concerns located around the world 
and…[with] investments in almost all of the areas where 
Executive Outcomes [had] conducted major operations.” 
(Singer, 2004, p.104) In addition to these orthodox 
holdings, the Branch Heritage Group also owned the private 
military companies, Sandline International and Ibis Air. 
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(Singer, 2004) Sandline was known to frequently subcontract 
to Executive Outcomes for the provision of employees and 
equipment used extensively throughout operations in Papua, 
New Guinea and Sierra Leone. (Singer, 2004) The other 
Branch Heritage holding, Ibis Air, was known as Executive 
Outcomes’  “private air force”. (Singer, 2004) Although it 
was officially an independent subsidiary of SRC, Ibis Air 
was involved in most of Executive Outcomes’ military 
operations. (Singer, 2004) The aviation firm provided a 
means of expanding operations beyond the borders of 
Southern Africa and enabled companies within the SRC to 
offer services on the global market. (Singer, 2004) In 
addition to the civilian passenger airliners owned and 
operated by Ibis Air, the company also operated a fleet 
Russian aircraft including Mi-17 armed transport 
helicopters, Mi-8 cargo aircraft, Mi-24 heavy gunships, as 
well as jet aircraft including MiG-23 fighter/bombers, and 
MiG-27, and Su-25 ground attack aircraft. (Singer, 2004) 
“These weapons were cheap, due to Cold War overproduction, 
and easy to obtain, usually from Eastern European dealers.” 
(Singer, 2004, p.106) 
  The result of Executive Outcomes’ complicated 
network of authority, staffing, and resources made the 
extent of its involvement in operations in Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Congo and Indonesia difficult to 
completely trace throughout the 1990s.(Singer, 2004) The 
firm’s practice of shrouding the nature of it military 
activities behind related subsidiaries and financial 
interests is part of the legacy left for the private 
military companies that are currently in operation around 
the world.  
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2. Major Private Military Companies  
 Successors to Executive Outcomes business model are 
numerous. Some of the most prolific and noteworthy 
companies populating the private military industry are 
discussed in the following sections. 
a. Blackwater USA 
  One of the most active private security firms 
currently in operation is the Moyock, North Carolina-based 
Blackwater USA. The company was founded in 1996 by former 
U.S. Navy SEAL, Gary Jackson with the goal of meeting the 
“anticipated demand for government outsourcing of firearms 
and related security training.”(Blackwater USA) Boasting a 
wide array of military services and specialties, the 
company consists of five subsidiaries. These are: (1) 
Blackwater Training Center; (2) Blackwater Target Systems; 
(3) Blackwater Security Consulting; (4) Blackwater Canine 
and (5) Blackwater Air. The firm claims to operate the “the 
largest privately-owned firearms training facility in the 
nation" at its North Carolina headquarters. This 6000-acre 
facility has been used extensively by U.S. military special 
forces and other federal security personnel. Beyond these 
rather innocuous offerings however  the most controversial 
aspect of Blackwater USA’s business has become security 
consulting. Under the auspices of “high threat protective 
security operations” the firm claims to provide its 
customers with highly trained and well armed private 
soldiers. Within the last few year these customers have 
included DoD and other federal agencies with increasing 
frequency. In 2002 the firm was awarded a five-year, $35.7 
million contract with the U.S. Navy to provide training in 
force protection, shipboard security, armed search and 
sentry techniques to sailors. (Dao, 2004)   
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  The firm was thrust to the center of the 
controversy concerning the privatized military when four of 
its employees (former US Army and Navy special forces 
operators) were slain, mutilated and dragged through the 
streets of Fallujah, Iraq following an ambush by Iraqi 
insurgents in April 2004. The Blackwater USA employees had 
been hired to provide security for food shipments within 
Iraq. (Dao, 2004) 
b. Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) 
  As a subsidiary of the monolithic Houston, Texas 
based energy company, Halliburton, KBR has become another 
one of the major private military contractors. KBR employs 
over 60,000 employees in over 43 countries to provide on-
site engineering and project management services usually 
related to its parent firm’s global oil and natural gas 
interests.(Wikipedia, 2005) The firm has a long and 
controversial legacy of providing its services to DoD. 
During World War II the firm (then Brown & Root) 
specialized in warship and base construction. Naval Air 
Station, Corpus Christi, Texas is the result of one of the 
firm’s early military construction contracts. During the 
Vietnam War, the firm was part of a consortium of four 
firms that built nearly 85% of the infrastructure used by 
the Army during the Vietnam War. (Wikipedia, 2005) “At the 
height of the war resistance movement in the [1960s], Brown 
& Root was derided as “Burn & Loot” by protestors and 
soldiers.”(Wikipedia, 2005) 
  More recently, the firm has established itself 
within the privatized military industry having provided 
armed transportation, communication and logistics support 
to US forces in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Persian 
Gulf. (Singer, Peacekeepers, 2003)  
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  The firm has been at the center of controversy 
with regard to its activities in OIF. In October 2003 the 
firm received a single no-bid contract for $7 billion under 
the auspices of “Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO)”. According to the 
Pentagon this contract, originally intended to facilitate 
the rebuilding of Iraqi oil fields, was awarded to KBR 
without bid because it was determined that it was the only 
company with the size and security clearance necessary to 
meet DoD requirements in Iraq. (Avant, 2005) Current 
estimates place the number of KBR employees in Iraq at over 
30,000. (Wikipedia, 2005) In addition to RIO, services 
provided to DoD include troop and air traffic control 
support, water production (74 million gallons of water a 
month for consumption, hygiene and laundry), supply 
delivery (deploying as many as 700 trucks a day to deliver 
essentials to the troops), and firefighting and crash-
rescue services. (Wikipedia, 2005) 
c. DYNCORP 
Another firm that has become highly active within 
the privatized military industry is the Reston, Virginia 
based DynCorp. In March 2003 DynCorp was acquired by an 
even larger government contractor, Computer Sciences 
Corporation (CSC) for approximately $914 million. Among the 
many services offered by the conglomerate are 
telecommunications, computer network integration, and 
healthcare.  
  Just prior to its acquisition in 2004 by Computer 
Sciences Corporation (CSC) in 2004, it was estimated that 
95% of DynCorp's revenues were from U.S. government 
contracts with defense-related contracts accounting for 
nearly 49 percent of the firm’s revenue in 2001. 
(Wikipedia, 2005)   
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  DynCorp has a strong presence in the area 
referred to in federal circles as "sustainment" or 
providing operational and logistical support such as base 
operations, aircraft maintenance and range services. For 
example, DynCorp has a variety of contracts to provide 
range services for the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy and 
the British Ministry of Defense.  
  DoD support provided by DynCorp also includes 
virtual training and what have been described as “high-
performance virtual simulation solutions.” (CSC, 2005) The 
firm’s primary portfolio of support however, includes “seat 
management, global logistics and infrastructure support, 
marine fleet management and aviation maintenance.” (CSC, 
2005) According to a DynCorp representative, the firm 
claims to “provide support for the warfighter from the day 
he or she joins the service until they're out in the 
battlefield actually at work. It's a whole life cycle 
support of the soldier”. (CSC, 2005)  
The firm’s support of military operations has continued:  
DynCorp has provided "contract field teams" for 
the U.S. military in major theaters, such as 
Bosnia, Somalia, Angola, Haiti, Colombia, Kosovo 
and Kuwait. It is also active in the Chapare 
province of Bolivia, eradicating coca fields. 
DynCorp also provides much of the security for 
Afghan interim president Hamid Karzai's 
presidential guard and training Afghanistan's 
fledgling police force. (Wikipedia, 2005) 
 
  As the controversy surrounding the employement 
private military companies has increased, identificaton as 
one of these  problematic firms has brought DynCorp 
unwelcome scrutiny.  
Critics accuse DynCorp of involvement in 
conflicts in Bolivia, where they are said to earn 
money with the smuggling of cocaine. In 1999, a 
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) lawsuit was filed against DynCorp 
employees stationed in Bosnia, which found, 
"employees and supervisors from DynCorp were 
engaging in perverse, illegal and inhumane 
behavior and were purchasing illegal weapons, 
women, forged passports and participating in 
other immoral acts.” (Wikipedia, 2005) 
   
 More recently, in October 2003, three DynCorp 
employees were slain in a Gaza Strip terrorist bombing. 
(Wikipedia, 2005)  The three personnel were providing 
security support American diplomats in the area in 
conjunction with the Diplomatic Security Service. 
(Wikipedia, 2005) 
3. Employment 
 Proof of the increasing acceptance of outsourcing 
traditional military functions to civilian contractors, has 
been the growing official employment of private security 
companies in recent years. Although details regarding the 
extent of their involvement in military operations are 
often closely withheld, these firms have played 
increasingly significant roles in recent years. 
a. The Columbian Drug War 
  Civilian contractors continue to play a major 
role in counter-narcotics operations in South America. 
Despite a cooperative effort with the Colombian government 
aimed at drug interdiction and infrastructure disruption, 
U.S. federal regulation prohibits any more than 400 U.S. 
troops from participating in operations in Colombia at any 
one time. (Van Dongen, 2003)  Several of the larger 
military contractors have taken advantage of this dearth in 
forces to assist in the effort. For instance, Northrop-
Grumman, under the auspices of its subsidiary, California 
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Microwave Systems (CMS) operates direct action counter 
narcotics missions as part in parcel of the larger effort 
referred to as “Plan Columbia”. This $1.3 billion 
U.S./Colombian effort has been described as a “U.S.-backed 
antinarcotics and anti-terrorism program.”(Van Dongen, 
2003)  Despite the nature of these operations, CMS 
estimates that the risks to its 190 personnel in Columbia 
as “low”. (Van Dongen, 2003) CMS’s participation in 
military operations has not come without costs however. In 
February 2003, four DoD-contracted CMS personnel were 
executed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) when their aircraft crashed in the Colombian jungle. 
(Van Dongen, 2003) In the wake of similar incidents 
including abductions and imprisonment, federal agencies 
employing civilian operators such as DoD have made jungle 
survival training mandatory for civilian contractors 
performing such operations. 
  According to the industry watchdog group 
CorpWatch, the most active co-participant in “Plan 
Colombia” is DynCorp. (Bigwood, 2001) The company has been 
firmly entrenched in operations in South America since 1997 
when it received a $600 million State Department contract. 
In accordance with this contract DynCorp’s operations 
include participation in “eradication missions, training 
and drug interdiction…air transport, reconnaissance, search 
and rescue, airborne medical evacuation, ferrying equipment 
and personnel from one country to another…[and] aircraft 
maintenance.”(Bigwood, 2001, p.2) The contract also permits 
DynCorp to “deploy to any worldwide location, including 
potentially, outside of Central and South America.” 
(Bigwood,2001, p.2) The complement of personnel is 
comprised largely of U.S. citizens, but includes 
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Colombians, Peruvians, and Guatemalans, many with U.S. 
government issued “secret” security clearances. The firm 
provides “just about any kind of personnel required to 
carry out the war in Colombia.” (Bigwood, 2001, p.2) For 
instance, the air assets at DynCorp’s disposal are amply 
potent. Its pilots operate the State Department’s armed UH-
1Hs, Bell-225s and T-65s aircraft. The T-65s “crop-dusters” 
are key to the eradication mission as they used to destroy 
coca fields from the air. (Bigwood, 2001) 
  In addition to DynCorp, the myriad of firms under 
the “Plan Colombia” umbrella including Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) which performs advanced 
imagery analysis, CMS, and the Rendon Group, which liaisons 
with the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the “Drug War” is 
overseen by two special State Department’s groups, the 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and Air Wing. (Bigwood, 
2001, p. 2) 
  Due largely to the size of its operation, and the 
extensive experience that it has accrued, DynCorp has 
assumed what may be considered a central leadership 
position in Columbian counter-narcotics operations. 
According to the State Department the firms contract grants 
it what is essentially “command and control” in the field. 
(Bigwood, 2001, p.2)  
b. Operation Desert Storm 
  Throughout Operation Desert Storm, it is 
estimated that the number of civilian contractors in Iraq 
was equivalent to one for every fifty uniformed military 
troops. (Avant, 2005, p. 2)  Wielding a more advanced and 
sophisticated fighting forces than ever before, the 
logistical and technical support required to sustain and 
operate the U.S. war machine necessitated the involvement 
53 
of civilian contractors that was far more robust than in 
previous operations. Concordantly, many of the private 
security firms that would come to play significant roles in 
later conflicts over the next decade used Iraq as the 
watershed operation in their transition from “mercenaries” 
to military service contractors. Not surprisingly, a 
significant number of employees who gained experience 
during the 1991 war in Iraq work for firms such as 
Blackwater, Custer Battles, MPRI, and DynCorp.   
c. Bosnian Peace-Keeping Operations 
  The U.S. force sent to quell the ethnic tensions 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1999 continued the trend of 
increasing DoD reliance on contract security forces. It is 
estimated that there was one civilian contractor for every 
10 active duty personnel. (Avant, 2005, p. 2) In 
particular, DynCorp played a major supporting role in the 
European conflict. Leveraging its core competency of 
security consulting, the firm was under contract to train 
indigenous police forces throughout Bosnia and Kosovo.  
d. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
  Private military contractors were extensively 
employed in the war in OEF. Civilians were among the early 
contingent of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In addition to 
operating directly with conventional and Special Operations 
Forces (SOFs), these personnel were detailed to the CIA’s 
paramilitary field units deployed to the region as well. In 
addition to performing combat missions, these contractors 
provided logistics, surveillance, and intelligence 
gathering support. For instance, the Global Hawk unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) that proved so effective in 
Afghanistan, was operated by civilian contractors. Private 
military companies continue have continued the efforts that 
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commenced in OEF by comprising a significant component of 
the multi-agency (DoD/CIA) task force created to locate 
Osama bin Laden and other members of his Al-Qaeda terrorist 
network. (Singer, 2004, p. 2) 
e. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
  In what will likely be considered one of the most 
significant and lucrative operations for the military 
security industry, operations in Iraq have cast more light 
on the activities of these companies than ever before. In 
May 2004, a contract in excess of $290 million was awarded 
by DoD to the firm, Aegis Defense Services. The contract 
stipulates that Aegis will perform the roles of 
“coordination and management” for the over 50 private 
security firms operating in Iraq alongside U.S. forces. As 
a subsidiary function, Aegis’ armed security teams provide 
protection for employees of the U.S. Project Management 
Office in country. (Singer, 2004) 
  Aegis’ primary role of managing the civilian 
security component of the U.S. force is no small task. The 
estimated 15,000 to 20,000 contractors in Iraq are 
“carrying out essential jobs that soldiers have done in the 
past-from handling logistics and maintenance to training 
the local army to fight pitched battles-and they have taken 
more casualties than any ally.”(Singer, 2004, p.1) 
  In the pre-war phase of OIF, private security 
firms performed many of their signature tasks including 
logistical, networking and intelligence support, training. 
For instance, the U.S Army facility at Camp Doha in the 
Kuwaiti desert was constructed operated and secured by the 
private consortium of U.S.-owned firms known as Combat 
Support Associates. (Singer, 2004, p. 3) 
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  For the extent of major combat operations that 
ensued in Iraq, private security companies provided key 
technical and maintenance support on many of DoD’s most 
sophisticated weapon systems, including the B-2 and F-117 
stealth, M1 tank, and AH-64 attack helicopter. Although 
this role had been provided in similar operations in the 
past, OIF was noteworthy in that the number of civilian 
contractors required to perform it had grown to nearly ten 
times the number required over a decade before in the 1991 
Gulf War.  
  Following the conclusion of major combat 
operations, the efforts of private security companies moved 
to the forefront. “According to the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), there were an estimated “15,000 contract 
soldiers in Iraq.” (Singer, 2004, p. 3)  By 2004, it was 
believed that this number had grown to exceed “more than 
twice that figure.” (Singer, 2004, p. 3) 
  According to foreign policy specialist, Deborah 
Avant, “The unstable environment [in Iraq] has stretched 
coalition forces thin, and the absence of a U.N. mandate 
has made tools such as U.N. peacekeepers and international 
civilian police unavailable, drawing private security 
companies closer to combat as the Iraqi insurgency 
continues.”(Avant, 2005, p. 2) 
  Many private military companies have come to Iraq 
in an effort to capitalize on the security void that 
presently exists there. For instance, the British firm, 
Global Risk Strategies, was hired to provide security 
assistance for the fleet of armored vehicles tasked with 
distributing the new Iraqi dinar throughout the country.  
  One of the most prolific firms operating in Iraq 
is Blackwater U.S.A.. In addition to providing personal 
56 
security for Paul Bremer, the head of the civilian 
provisional authority in Iraq, the firm is active from 
Baghdad to Mosul providing armed security for logistics 
shipments, high profile diplomats and other officials. 
(Dao, 2004)       
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, several of the most significant 
trends of defense co-production were examined. Changing 
national security priorities, increased outsourcing of 
military functions and the emergence and use of private 
military companies have greatly altered the modern 
battlefield. The following chapter will examine the impact 





A. MINIMAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
 One of the many issues that developed as a result of 
DoD’s increased reliance on contract weapon systems and 
services is reduced congressional oversight. Despite the 
extensive and meticulous authorization and appropriation 
processes, many instances of over billing remain 
imperceptible without focused scrutiny.  
1. “Cost-Plus” Contracting  
 One of the major causes of these irregularities is 
“cost-plus” pricing. Originally conceived as means of 
ensuring “fair” cost reimbursement, “cost-plus” was 
designed to enable companies to recover many of the 
reasonable but unforeseen or unanticipated costs of 
executing a contract. Contracts with these clauses have 
become highly problematic however. First, they have proven 
to be perverse incentives for firms to “pad” their 
contracts since the more they spend the more they stand to 
be reimbursed by the government. “In effect, [it] rewards 
companies with high profits the more they spend, and thus 
is ripe for abuse and inefficiency.”(Singer, 2004, p.1) 
 In addition, since government contracts are generally 
awarded to the lowest bidder, “cost-plus” pricing disrupts 
the competitive bidding process by allowing a firm to put 
forth a low bid to win a contract and then more than recoup 
this deficit with subsequent charges to the government. 
These “cost-plus” arrangements are particularly 
advantageous for firms that are able to circumvent the 
bidding process entirely. The nearly $300 million no-bid 
“cost-plus” contract awarded to Aegis Defense Services in 
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May 2004, has drawn scrutiny for these reasons. Aegis, a 
fledgling private military company that has been in 
operation for barely two years, was granted what is in 
essence a “blank check” to provide security services in 
Iraq without the reputation and contracting history that is 
normally required. According to Singer, “The usual 
mechanisms that increase efficiency in contracting—like 
choosing, rewarding, and punishing firms based on their 
experience and reputation—have again been short-circuited. 
One would think that such a major contract would go to 
company that has a long operating history, or experience in 
such roles, or other major activities in Iraq.”(Singer, 
2004, p.1)   Given the recent widespread allegations of 
over-billing DoD-wide considerable faith has been placed in 
a firm that is not even one of the U.S. State Department’s 
recommended security firm’s in Iraq. (Singer, 2004) 
 In addition to billing irregularities stemming from 
cost-plus contracting, a February 2002 GAO report revealed 
numerous instance of contractor over-charging DoD for 
service support. GAO uncovered instances of contractors 
“charging ‘unaffordable’ prices for technical data to 
support equipment they have sold to the military.” 
(Robinson and Pasternak, 2002: p.3) In a specific example 
involving the Army’s ‘Spitfire’ communication terminals GAO 
found the following: 
The manufacturer was willing to sell the data for 
$100 million—almost as much as what the entire 
program cost ($120 million) from 1996 to 
2001...Despite grappling with all these issues 
says one chagrined DoD official, “We are pretty 
much where we were in 1991.” (Robinson and 




2.  Unknown Dimensions 
 As the role of the private sector in defense co-
production has become increasingly prominent, one issue 
that has begun to draw controversy is the ambiguity that 
persists with regard to the exact dimensions of defense 
industry’s involvement. Of growing concern to many 
(particularly in Congress) is that the full extent to which 
private military contractors are performing roles and 
missions believed to be under the purview of the uniformed 
services is unknown. Attempts to ascertain the role of the 
private sector is confounded by the fact that DoD does not 
know how many contractors are currently in its employ. In a 
report to Congress in April 2002, Army Secretary Thomas E. 
White revealed the uncertainty and ambiguity in the Army’s 
service contracting by reporting that the service had 
outsourced between 124,000 and 605,000 person-work-years in 
2001. (Robinson and Pasternak, 2002)  What is more 
perplexing is that there is still not a “reliable count of 
the contractors who provide ‘emergency essential’ services 
on the battlefront and elsewhere, despite the urging of 
the...[DoD] inspector general a decade ago.” (Robinson and 
Pasternak, 2002: p.2)  Despite the Army Secretary’s attempt 
to bring greater clarity to the issue, the information 
gathering process did not begin until mid-2004. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) noted that “there is only limited 
visibility or control at the DoD or military department 
level and information systems that provide reliable data 
and are capable of being used as a management tool are 
lacking.” (CPI, 2004: p.2)   In an internal email obtained 
by US News & World Report, an Army colonel made the 
following request of the Army’s logistics head: 
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At the very least, he could count these little 
beggars in some fashion before they show up on 
the battlefield and surprise some poor commander 
with horrific support, real estate and security 
requirements. (Robinson and Pasternak, 2002: p.2) 
B. LACK OF GUIDANCE 
 One of the critical concerns regarding the increased 
used of contractors is the absence of clear and specific 
guidance regarding the manner and extent to which these 
civilian assets may be employed. Despite the fact that 
contractors have, and continue to provide critical services 
to deployed forces, they are not officially addressed in 
the strategic or operational doctrine of any component of 
DoD. In a published report presented to the Readiness and 
Support Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the GAO identified what it believed to be 
significant issues and potential risks stemming from the 
dearth of official guidance.  
1. Continuation of Vital Services 
 One of the major issues broached by the GAO study 
centered on the continuation of vital services in the event 
that contractor support is unavailable. Although this topic 
has received considerable attention recently, DoD 
officially acknowledged these risks nearly two decades 
ago.(GAO, 2003)  In a report presented by the Office of the 
Inspector General (IG) in November 1988, it was determined 
that none of the DoD components or related defense agencies 
were adequately prepared to sustain the level or range of 
essential services that were outsourced to civilian 
contractors.(GAO, 2003) The report concluded that there was 
“no central oversight of contracts for emergency services, 
no legal basis to compel contractors to perform, and no 
means to enforce contractor terms.”(GAO, 2003, p.11) 
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 Beyond this, the IG presented two recommendations to 
DoD. First, services that it termed “war stoppers” should 
remain exclusively within the purview of the uniformed 
services. Examples of these include vital logistics or 
information technology support which according to DoD 
Instruction 3020.37 “impact the effectiveness of defense 
systems or operations” (GAO, 2003: p.11)   Second, if 
constraints or the needs required these services could be 
outsourced so long as a feasibly executable, Department-
wide contractor employment plan existed for such 
contingencies. (GAO, 2003)  
 The conclusions and recommendations of the IG report 
had both an immediate and direct impact on defense policy. 
Reflecting its concurrence with the finding presented, DoD 
issued Instruction 3020.37 in November 1990 in an effort to 
resolve many of the existing and potential issues stemming 
from the co-production of core defense functions with the 
private sector. The instruction required the component 
services, joint staffs, component commands and defense 
agencies to first identify the vital services that were 
currently outsourced and then continue to review these 
services by individual contract on a yearly basis. Further, 
in instances where there was ambiguity with regard to what 
constituted “vital” during a crisis situation, the 
cognizant service head or component commander would bear 
the responsibility for finding and maintaining an alternate 
source to continue to provide a level of capability 




Figure 2.   DOD INSTRUCTION 3020.37 Essential Services 
Flowchart. (From: GAO, 2003, p.14) 
  
 Despite the mandate issued by DoD in 1991, the GAO 
determined that issues remain with regard to implementation 
of specific policies pursuant to Instruction 3020.37. 
First, despite being directed to identify and consolidate 
the services that were deemed to be mission critical, there 
was little evidence to suggest that the services, joint 
staffs, or related agencies had begun to consider, let 
alone, incorporate these procedural requirements into their 





Figure 3.   Dispersion of Contracts Awarded for Selected 
Services in Bosnia. (From: GAO, 2003, p.32) 
 
 GAO’s investigation revealed that none of the DoD entities 
were conducting the mandatory critical service reviews that 
they had been directed to perform. The agency elaborated on 
its findings: 
None of the regional combatant commands, service 
component commanders, or installations visited 
during our review had an ongoing process for 
reviewing contracts as required by DoD 
Instruction 3020.37. Without identifying mission 
essential contracts, commanders do not know what 
essential services could be at risk during 
operations. Furthermore, the commanders cannot 
determine when backup plans are needed, nor can 
they assess the risks they would have to accept 
with the loss of contractor services. One Air 
Force official indicated that our visit had 
prompted a review of their contracts to identify 
those that provided essential services and that 
he became aware of this requirement only when we 
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asked about their compliance with the 
instruction. [GAO, 2003:p.15] 
 In addition to the pervasive unfamiliarity throughout 
the services, components, and agencies with regard to the 
use of contractors, implementation of these measures is 
hampered greatly by the lack of top-down monitoring and 
enforcement. Despite explicit language that directs the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense to “periodically monitor 
implementation” of Instruction 3020.37, GAO found little to 
suggest that this oversight was being provided. (GAO, 2003) 
According to a cognizant official (in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) 
interviewed by GAO, the official assessment was that since 
no difficulties had been vetted by the subsidiary agencies, 
they were presumed to be complying with the instruction. 
(GAO, 2003) 
 Consistent with the failure to identify mission 
critical contractor services, GAO noted that provisions for 
alternate logistical or mission related function to be 
lacking as well. GAO noted: 
Many of the people we talked to assumed that the 
personnel needed to continue essential services 
would be provided, either by contractors or 
organic military capability and did not see a 
need for a formal backup plan. The only written 
backup plan that we found was for maintenance of 
the Air Force’s C21J executive aircraft. 
According to the plan, if contractors are 
unavailable, Air Force personnel will provide 
maintenance. However, according to Air Force 
officials, no one in the Air Force is trained to 
maintain this aircraft. (GAO, 2003:p.16) 
 Despite the increase in outsourced military functions 
there are significant limitations pursuant to phenomenon 
that have not been addressed. As noted by GAO, there are no 
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legally enforceable guidelines requiring contractors to 
remain in a hostile operational area if they choose not to 
do so. The common presumption among many of the military 
officials interviewed by GAO was that the consistent level 
of contractor support received in past operations suggested 
a trend in stability that would likely continue. As 
operations in Iraq (both DESERT STORM and OIF) have 
demonstrated, the actual physical risk to these civilian 
personnel has seen an escalation that is commensurate with 
their increased deployment to hostile war zones. For 
instance, in the 1991 Persian Gulf, seven military service 
contractors were killed in the execution of their 
contract.(GAO, 2003)  In the wake of major combat 
operations following OIF, numerous firms such as Blackwater 
U.S.A. have suffered personnel losses in the execution of 
their logistical and security commitments to the U.S. 
military units with whom they were operating. 
 Another issue raised by the GAO is that in addition to 
the general lack of contingency planning, many of the 
tenuously conceived backup plans that do exist throughout 
DoD commonly reference the same alternate contractors or 
private firms in the event of disruptions to their primary 
sources. As a result, the actual capability believed to be 
in reserved may not actually exist. Poignant examples were 
provided by the Air Force and the Army with regard to 
support for their fixed-wing aircraft. GAO noted: 
The Air Force’s lack of in-house maintenance 
capability for its C21J aircraft mentioned 
earlier and the Army’s total dependence on 
contractor support for all of its fixed wing 
aircraft are examples of the lack of organic 
capability. For some contracts, comparably 
skilled contractor personnel may not be available 
from other companies. For example, we were told 
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at one location that only certain contractors 
have access to proprietary technical and backup 
data from the manufacturers of specific aircraft 
or systems. Additionally, the contracted services 
required for military operations may also be 
needed by others. For example, shortages of 
qualified linguists to support Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan delayed interrogations and 
signals exploitations. Among the reasons given 
for the shortage were the competing demands of 
government agencies for the same skills. (GAO, 
2003: p.17) 
 Despite the risks involved with relying on civilian 
contractors for mission critical services, the elimination 
of these services pose immediate risks as well. At present, 
there is a lack of available or untapped capacity to 
fulfill current requirements. For example, in Task Force 
Eagle in Bosnia the GAO determined that elimination of the 
intelligence and language support that it currently 
outsources would severely diminish the capability of the 
force operating in the theater. (GAO, 2003)  Additionally, 
the GAO pointed to the Army’s dependence upon contractors 
to maintain the biological agent testing equipment in use 
in Afghanistan. Although soldiers operate the gear, 
elimination of contractor support services would greatly 
increase the risks to the U.S. forces operating in the 
region. (GAO, 2003) 
 Based on its research and findings regarding critical 
contractor-provided services, the GAO recommended that DoD 
first identify the spectrum of vital services provided by 
civilian contractors and make a concerted effort to 
incorporate them into its planning particularly at the 
strategic level. (GAO, 2003)  Specifically, the strategic 
planning that the agency referred to was DoD’s Human 
Capital Strategy. Although civilian contractors are 
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officially referenced in DoD literature (Joint Publication 
4-05) as key components of the optimal total force mix, the 
department’s human capital strategy makes no official 
acknowledgement or reference to the employment of personnel 
from the private sector. This deficiency has been noted by 
multiple advisory boards within the DoD organization. For 
instance, in a human resource strategy report published in 
2003 by the Defense Science Board it was recommended that 
DoD and its subsidiary agencies develop a consolidated 
total force perspective with realistic attention placed on 
eliminating the ambiguity that plagues the relationship 
between military service contractors and the uniformed 
services. A subsequent study conducted by the National 
Academy of Public Administration yielded similar 
conclusions. This organization noted that “as more work is 
privatized and more traditionally military tasks require 
support of civilians or contractor personnel, a more 
unified approach to force planning and management will be 
necessary; serious shortfalls in any one of the force 
elements (military, civilian, or contractor) will damage 
mission accomplishment.” (GAO, 2003: p.19) 
2. Development and Deployment of Standards 
 Another significant issue that has come to plague 
DoD’s employment of contractors is the ambiguity and 
inconsistency that exists with regard to standards and 
official guidance available. The GAO’s investigation 
revealed considerable variation throughout DoD. For 
instance the agency noted: 
DoD Directive 2000.12 establishes DoD’s anti-
terrorism and force protection policy. 
DoD Instruction 2000.16 establishes specific 
force protection standards pursuant to the policy 
established by DoD Directive 2000.12. In the case 
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of contractor  support for deployed forces, we 
found no DoD-wide guidance that establishes any 
baseline policy regarding the use of contractors 
to support deployed forces or the government’s 
obligations to these contractors. (GAO, 2003: 
p.20-21) 
 GAO determined that such ambiguity had pervaded the 
Joint Staffs as well. The agency noted that despite 
adhering to Joint Publication 4-0 (Doctrine for Logistic 
Support of Joint Operations, “Chapter V, Contractors in the 
Theater”) that outlines the regional combatant commanders’ 
responsibilities as the integrating and liaison authority, 
there are other conflicting directives that are applied at 
the joint level as well. GAO noted: 
In addition to Joint Publication 4-0, the 
following DoD documents address the contractors 
at deployed locations: 
DoD Directive 2000.12 and DoD Instruction 
2000.16, define the anti-terrorism and force 
protection responsibilities of the military. 
These include force protection responsibilities 
to contractors as well as contractors who deploy. 
Joint Publication 3-11, includes a requirement 
that mission-essential contractors be provided 
with chemical and biological survival equipment 
and training. 
DoD Directive 4500.54 requires all non-DoD 
personnel traveling under DoD sponsorship to 
obtain country clearance. While the directive 
does not specify contractors it does apply to 
them, further complicating the ability of a 
commander to become aware of his responsibility.  
Joint Publication 4-0 only applies to combatant 
commanders involved in joint operations. However, 
at the regional combatant commands we visited, 
contracting, logistics and planning officials 
were not implementing the Joint Publication. 
[GAO, 2003: p.21-22] 
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 Among the component services, the Army’s direction 
with regard to contractor support is the most thorough. As 
the most the prolific user of deployed contractors, 
specific guidance is provided by official documents 
including, Army Regulation 715-9-Contractors Accompanying 
the Force; Army Field Manual 3-100.21-Contractors on the 
Battlefield; and Army Pamphlet 715-16-Contractor Deployment 
Guide. (GAO, 2003) In addition to these sources, the Army’s 
Area Support Group continues to generate guidance tailored 
to specific operational areas. Further guidance is also 
available through the Army Materiel Command web site. 
 As the second most prolific user of contracted 
services, it is not surprising that the Air Force’s 
official guidance with regard to contractors is also 
relatively well established. Similarities exist with Army 
doctrine as well. The GAO noted that in locations like 
Bosnia and Kuwait the Army and Air Force outsource support 
for overlapping functions. In particular, force protection 
and logistical support services are often shared. In Bosnia 
for instance, Air Force contractors render maintenance 
support for the Army’s Apache and Blackhawk helicopters. 
(GAO, 2003) Although the Air Force has fewer published 
documents that specifically address the employment of 
private contractors, regionally specific guidance does 
exist. In 2001 for instance, the Air Force issued a policy 
memorandum to govern the use of contractors at the 
Southeast Asian Combined Operations Center. “The purpose of 
the memorandum [was] to provide consistent and uniform 
guidance on the use of U.S. contractor personnel to augment 
the support of Air Force operations in wartime and 
contingency operations.” (GAO, 2003: p. 24)  
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 Unlike the Army, which provides the clearest guidance 
as to how to execute the tenets of its direction, the Air 
Force’s policy provides much less explicit guidance. “For 
example, the Air force does not have a comparable document 
to the Army’s Contractor Deployment Guide, to instruct 
contracting personnel or contractor employees on deployment 
requirements such as training, medical screenings, and 
logistical support.” (GAO, 2003: p.24) 
 The GAO’s study revealed that the service components 
that provide the least guidance with regard to contractor 
employment were the Marine Corps and Navy. The most 
significant guidance is provided by, Marine Corps Order 
4200.32 (Contractor Logistics Support for Ground Equipment, 
Ground Weapons Systems, December 2000). In addition to 
lacking an implementation scheme, the order “is limited to 
a statement that contractor personnel should not be 
deployed forward of the port of debarkation and that 
contractor logistics support requirements be included in 
all planning scenarios.”(GAO, 2003: p.24)   
 Like the Marine Corps’ sparse guidance with regard to 
deployed contractors, the Navy’s provisions were found to 
be ill-defined by the GAO. According to the GAO, Navy 
officials rationalized this by explaining that force 
protection concerns generally fall within the purview of 
ship’s force since contractors generally deploy on ships. 
(GAO, 2003) Issues persist however. The GAO noted that 
of the seven contractors killed during the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War, three were performing services for the Navy. 
According to GAO, shipboard contractors may also be 
detrimentally affected by the dearth in oversight. For 
instance, an emerging issue at the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command was whether the military corpsmen were 
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authorized to render medical treatment to their civilian 
shipmates. (GAO, 2003) 
 Perhaps the most detrimental result of varying 
guidance throughout DoD is the ambiguity this foments with 
regard to developing compatible courses of action, 
particularly when the direction that has been put forth is 
contradictory. The GAO found examples of this with regard 
to force protection for deployed contractor personnel.  
Specifically: 
Joint Publication 4-0 “Chapter V,” states “Force 
protection responsibility for DoD contractor 
employees is a contractor responsibility, unless 
valid contract terms place that responsibility 
with another party.” 
Army Field Manual 3-100-21 states, “Protecting 
contractors and their employees on the 
battlefield is the commander’s responsibility. 
When contractors perform in potentially hostile 
or hazardous areas, the supported military forces 
must assure the protection of their operations 
and employees. The responsibility for assuring 
that contractors receive adequate force 
protection starts with the combatant commander, 
extends downward, and includes the contractor.” 
The Air Force policy memorandum states, “The Air 
Force may provide or make available, under terms 
and conditions as specified in the contract, 
force protection…commensurate with those provided 
to DoD civilian personnel to the extent 
authorized by U.S. and host nation law.” (GAO, 
2003: p.25) 
 The GAO’s remedy to the breakdown and frequent 
conflict in oversight that it discovered was the 
establishment of realistic and enforceable regulations for 
the employment of civilian contractors that may be applied 
in a consistent manner throughout DoD and its related 
agencies. GAO recommended the development and use of 
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“standard language” in contracts with firms providing 
defense-related services. In addition, the GAO recommended 
that DoD develop and implement comprehensive guidance and 
doctrine to provide the Service more adequately resolve 
many of vagaries that have emerged as a result of the close 
working relationship between military units and deployed 
civilian contractors. (GAO, 2003) 
3. Planning for Contractor Deployment 
 The third major issue plaguing the employment of 
military contractors was that there is no mechanism 
available to ensure that contracts include specific 
language related to deployment procedures for contractors 
nor is there any supervisory assurance that various 
outsourced services adequately meet deployment 
requirements. The GAO uncovered numerous examples stemming 
from this oversight. DoD-wide examples included: 
The contract for an Army communications system 
needed to be modified when the system was 
relocated from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait (and would 
need to be modified again if the system were 
brought into Iraq) because the contract did not 
contain provisions for deployment to other 
locations. 
The Air Force predator unmanned vehicle contract 
did not envision deployment since the predator 
was developed as an advanced technology concept 
demonstration project. 
An engineering support contract for the Navy did 
not contain a specific deployment clause but only 
states that the contractor must support the Navy 
ashore or afloat. (GAO, 2003: p.27) 
 A subsequent review by the Army’s Combined Arms 
Support Command revealed similar problems. In an analysis 
of contracting data related to the 4th Infantry Division 44 
of the 89 contracts that were reviewed required the 
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contractors to deploy as required to support operations. 
Only 23 of the 44 contracts contained specific guidance or 
language regarding these potential deployments however. 
(GAO, 2003)  Despite these vagaries and omission in 
contract language there was no significant impact on the 4th 
Infantry Divisions to deploy its civilian and military 
personnel in support of OIF. 
 Other military officials interviewed by the GAO 
expressed concerns that the additional requirements would 
increase both the timeline and expense of obtaining 
contractor support. The Army provided the following 
example: 
…the contract for support of the Army’s pre-
positioned equipment in Qatar did not include 
language that provided for a potential deployment 
to Kuwait. As a result, when the need arose to 
move the equipment to Kuwait, the contract needed 
to be modified. (The cost of the modification was 
$53 million although it is not clear what amount, 
if any, the government could have saved had 
deployment language already been included in the 
contract.) (GAO, 2003: p.28) 
 As a result of the GAO’s investigation, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology issued two directives in 2002. A January 
memorandum directed, “that development contracts providing 
support contractor personnel shall contain guidance if they 
have any likelihood of being deployed outside of the United 
States.” (GAO, 2003: p.27)  Later in June of that year the 
same office issue another memorandum recommending that 
Program Managers and Program Executive Officers amend their 
acquisition and development mindsets to focus on systems 
that do not require such robust or persistent contractor 
support. (GAO, 2003) 
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C. OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
 An aspect of the increasing private sector role in 
defense co-production that cannot be ignored is the impact 
on DoD’s current and future operations.  
1. Challenge to Command and Control 
 Answering the simplest question of what civilian or 
military authority is in control is often one of the most 
complicated. In peace time the chain of command is 
generally less troublesome. Officially, military 
contractors report to a cognizant department or agency 
contracting officer. In the event that the COCOM or theater 
commander requires services or support above and beyond the 
original contract, this commander must advise the 
contractor of what revisions to make to the contract. In 
wartime however this command architecture is often 
problematic. An Army colonel operating in the Balkans 
described the difficulties that this relationship fomented: 
Who controls systems’ contractors? In my opinion, 
this was the toughest area in accountability... 
Systems contractors in the MI [military 
intelligence] and signal area were 
everywhere...It seemed clear to me that system 
contractors are important and also somewhat out 
of control. (Robinson and Pasternak, 2002: p.3)  
 The GAO noted that many of the contracts issued 
throughout DoD lack the necessary language requiring 
contractors to support deployed forces and abide by the 
policies of the commands with which they are closely 
operating. It has been recommended by some in DoD that the 
regional or component commander be given the authority to 
require contractors to comply with all general orders and 
force protection policies. (GAO, 2003)   Operational 
examples of the difficulties caused by these contiguous 
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command structures are numerous. For instance, “Army policy 
requires that contractors follow all general orders and 
force protection policies of the local commander. However, 
these requirements were not always written into the 
contract documents and thus may not be enforceable. In such 
situations, commanders may not have the ability to control 
contractor activities in accordance with general orders.” 
(GAO, 2003: p.28)  Similar complications exist for 
military commanders operating in Bosnia where the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) “expressed…concern that the base 
commander was not authorized to prevent contractor 
personnel from entering a local mosque in a high threat 
environment. [The JAG] suggested that commanders should 
always be able to control contractor activities where 
matters of force protection are concerned.” (GAO, 2003: 
p.28) 
2. Susceptibility to Market Forces 
The use of military contractors brings with it new 
perils. The increased dependence upon the specialized 
services of private military companies for security and 
logistics support will require DoD to come to terms with 
the fact that an increasing portion of its total force 
structure is primarily profit-driven. In the words of 
Brookings Institute Foreign Policy Fellow, Peter Singer, 
“the security goals of the clients are often in tension 
with the firms’ aims of profit maximization. The result is 
that considerations of the good of the private company are 
not always identical with the public good.” (Singer 2003: 
p.6) As Singer further asserts, “the ensuing dangers 
include all the problems one has in standard contracting 
and business outsourcing. The hired firms have incentives 
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to overcharge, pad their personnel lists, hide failures, 
not perform to their peak capacity, and so on. The worry, 
though, is that these are all now transferred into the 
security realm, where people’s lives are at stake.” (Singer 
2003: p. 6) 
Although DoD uses privatized security sparingly 
relative to other government agencies, it is important that 
the assimilation of contractors into the force structure be 
executed prudently. As Singer asserts, one of the most 
potentially problematic consequences of outsourcing is that 
it involves relinquishing control over the defense function 
that is being provided. The client’s security is ultimately 
left to be driven by costs and market incentives. (Singer, 
2003)   To further illustrate this point Singer poses the 
following example: 
A firm hired to establish a safe haven might 
later find the situation more difficult than it 
originally expected. The operation might become 
unprofitable or, due to any increase in local 
opposition, more dangerous than anticipated. Thus 
the company could find it in its corporate 
interest to pull out. Or, even if the company is 
kept in line by market constraints, its employees 
might decide that the personal risks they face in 
sticking it out in an operation are too high 
relative to their pay. Not bound by military law, 
they can simply break their contracts without 
fear of punishment and find safer, better paying 
work elsewhere. In either case the result is the 
same: the abandonment of those who were dependant 
on private [security] without consideration for 
the political costs or the client’s ability to 






D. LEGAL ISSUES 
 The private security industry received global media 
exposure and scrutiny when in the wake of the Iraqi 
detainee abuse scandal it was learned that many of the 
offenders implicated at the Abu Ghraib prison were civilian 
contractors. As DoD continues to outsource security, 
intelligence, and logistical support to private 
contractors, such legal irregularities are likely to become 
more frequent and costly for the defense industry and the 
U.S. at large.  
 A major cause of these irregularities is that civilian 
contractors are not addressed by the prevailing conventions 
of war. Personnel working for firms such as Blackwater 
U.S.A., are not members of the nation’s uniformed services 
despite the fact that they are often heavily armed and 
similarly clothed and equipped. It would be even more 
difficult to argue that these personnel are innocent 
civilians however. Resolving these vagaries in 
international law is imperative before events on the 
battlefield require DoD to do so. 
1. Law of Armed Conflict 
The conduct of war is generally constrained by a body 
of doctrine known as the Law of Armed Conflict. These rules 
of international law were conceived in order to constrain 
warring armies by an underlying respect for human life, 
abatement of suffering and the sparing use of force.      
 The original body of law was amended in 1863 by Dr. 
Francis Lieber. Lieber introduced what would later become 
known as the “Lieber Code” which extended legal protections 
and ensured humane treatment to civilians, prisoners, and 
spies. (Vernon, 2003)  Lieber’s work has been credited as 
the driving force behind the first Geneva Convention of 
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1864 under the auspices of the Convention for the Condition 
of the Wounded of the Armies in the Field. The primary 
focus of the convention’s ten articles was on ensuring care 
for the sick and wounded by requiring nations to extend 
medical care to all soldiers wounded on the battlefield, 
not just their own. (Vernon, 2003) 
The law of armed conflict was further modified by the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and subsequently the 
four Geneva Conventions. These conventions extend legal 
protection to the sick and wounded on the battlefield (and 
sea) and place guidelines on the treatment of prisoners of 
war and civilians. (Vernon, 2003)  
Additional doctrine has been incorporated into the law 
of armed conflict. In 1974, the ICRC submitted amendments 
to the Geneva Conventions. In 1977, these proposals 
resulted in two protocols. “The first protocol dealt with 
international conflicts, while the Second Protocol focused 
exclusively on non-international conflicts…The first 
protocol is [most] significant [here] because it 
established the rule prohibiting the targeting of civilians 
and civilian objects.” (Vernon, 2003: p.58)  
2. Complications with International Law 
One of the most fundamental and binding distinction 
made by the law of armed conflict is between combatants and 
non-combatants. Combatants are generally considered to be 
members of organized military units while non-combatants 
are considered to be private citizens not involved in 
hostilities. (Vernon, 2003) “The law of armed conflict 
ensures that an individual in one class cannot involve the 
privileges and protections of both. An individual can face 
serious consequences under international law when his 
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actions place him somewhere in between.” (Vernon, 2003: 
p.60)  Consequently, there are only three other categories 
of individuals recognized under international law. These 
are: (1) Civilians, (2) Illegal Combatants, and (3) Quasi-
Combatants. The dilemma faced by DoD and defense industry 
is that personnel working alongside the armed service as 
quasi-combatants bear characteristics pursuant to each of 
these three groups. “Civilians are a subclass of ‘non-
combatant.’ Like non-combatants, civilians become ‘illegal 
combatants’ when they engage in hostile activities. 
Likewise, armed forces cannot directly attack civilians.” 
(Vernon, 2003: p.63)  Violation of these legal precepts 
carries severe penalties that may be punishable under 
criminal law. In addition to prosecution, offenders face 
execution for hostile acts committed as illegal 
combatants.” (Vernon, 2003) 
In an attempt to reconcile what would seem to be a 
clear violation of international law, DoD introduced a new 
designation called, “Civilians Accompanying the Force”, 
based on Article Four of the Third Geneva Convention. As 
the only mention of this status within the entire body of 
international law, this article extends “prisoner of war” 
status to individuals identified as members of the regular 
armed forces, members of volunteer militias, merchant 
marines, and civilians accompanying the force.” (Vernon, 
2003)  Acceptance of DoD’s interpretation of the Third 
Geneva Convention is not without controversy, however. Some 
legal experts believe that the designation that has been 
granted to virtually all battlefield contractors is far too 
liberal in its application citing the changing role of 
contractors over the last half-century. They argue: 
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Article 3 of the third Geneva Convention was 
written to accommodate warfare in 1949 when 
contractors primarily supported armies by 
providing supplies. Today’s contractor provides a 
broader variety of services, well beyond the 
supply services contemplated in 1949. System 
support contractors maintain, and often operate, 
sophisticated weapons and communications systems 
on the battlefield. Under the Hague convention, 
prisoner of war status was given to “individuals 
who follow an army without directly belonging to 
it, such as newspaper correspondents and 
reporters, sutlers, contractors.” The Third 
Geneva Convention in 1949 added the word 
“supply”. Parties entitled to prisoner of war 
status now included “civilian members of air 
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, 
members of labor units or of services responsible 
for the welfare of the armed forces.” This 
addition considerably narrowed contractor 
eligibility to those performing supply functions. 
(Vernon, 2003: p.69-70) 
Clearly, not all of the services performed by civilian 
contractors may be considered to be supply-related. 
Consequently, the “accompanying the force” designation may 
be erroneously applied. As a result, there is a significant 
conflict between military policy and international law. 
Although a situation has not yet emerged to bring this rift 
to the forefront, this circumstance is no less troublesome 
since an increasing percentage of DoD’s force may be 
operating in violation of international accords, thereby 
forfeiting the legal protections they are presumed to have.  
Perhaps recognizing the tenuous protections afforded 
by their legal status, DoD officially prohibits civilian 
contractors from performing roles that may render them 
combatants under international law. This policy, which 
prohibits contractors from performing military functions, 
is neither overseen nor enforced however. Indeed, the 
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definition of which functions are exclusively “military 
functions” remains to be thoroughly determined and 
communicated throughout DoD. As a result, the components 
and agencies have been left to make this determination 
themselves with varying outcomes. For instance, the Army 
refers to its embedded pool of contractors as “civilians 
accompanying the Armed Forces in the theater of operations 
as authorized members of that force.” (Vernon, 2003: p.66) 
Policy contradictions exist however. Although civilian 
contractors are not permitted to wear distinctly military 
apparel (i.e. battle dress uniforms) they are permitted to 
carry and use weapons. In fact, military commanders have 
the authority to issue weapons to contractors as long as 
the individuals and firms agree to the terms and all 
policies concerning training, safety, and accountability 
are adhered to. (Vernon, 2003) The Army’s policy further 
complicates the designation of civilian contractors under 
international law. “This policy benefits contract employees 
because it gives them the ability to defend themselves. It 
places contractors, however, in an awkward position. They 
are liable for the actions of their employees if they allow 
them to arm, yet they do not want to leave them unarmed in 
hostile territory.” (Vernon, 2003: p.68) 
In the absence of discrete DoD-wide guidelines 
regarding the legal status of civilian contractors the 
policies of the components continue to diverge. For 
instance, while the Air Force shares the Army’s policy of 
forbidding contractors from wearing distinctly military 
apparel, it does not allow contractors to use or carry 
weapons except under very rare circumstances. The cognizant 
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commander is granted the authority to determine what these 
exceptional circumstances are. (Vernon, 2003) 
Clearly, there are varying opinions within DoD and at 
large regarding the legal designation of civilian 
contractors on the battlefield. Whether considered to be 
“accompanying the force” or combatants, the risks that 
civilian contractors continue to face in support of 
deployed operational military forces remain unabated by 
these doctrinal interpretations. As the number of 
publicized events involving the use of force on or against 
civilian contractors (e.g. the Fallujah massacre of 
Blackwater U.S.A. employees in 2003) the legal rights of 
both the contractors and pursuant to the U.S. military 
force remained ambiguous and potentially unrealized. For 
this reason it is imperative that DoD develop a clear, 
concise, and enforceable body of policy for the component 
to adhere to.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter many of the issues that complicate 
defense co-production were examined. Despite the increased 
reliance on support from the private sector, the use of 
military contractors is plagued by a lack of oversight and 
official guidance. In addition to these challenges, 
operational and legal issues further complicate the 
provision of defense by DoD and the private sector. The 
remaining chapter will present general conclusions about 





VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The provision of U.S. national security clearly 
exceeds the domain and capability of the military. As 
Chapter II explained, national defense has increasingly 
become an output of the combined resources and efforts of 
the defense industry and the overarching influence of 
legislative policy.  With a focus largely on the 
interaction between the public defense establishment and 
the private sector Chapter III provided a historical 
summary of the military-industrial complex as it exists 
today. Building on this, Chapter IV presented many of the 
significant trends that have developed related to the co-
production of defense by the military and the defense 
industry. Chapter V carried these findings even further by 
elucidating many of the potential perils that have emerged 
as a result of the increasing interdependence between the 
military and the defense industrial base. 
This chapter will present general conclusion drawn 
from the entire body of research in this thesis on defense 
co-production. In addition, it will answer each of the 
research questions posed in Chapter I and suggest areas for 
further research on the subject matter related to this 
thesis.  
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 (1) How does the economic definition of co-production 
 relate to defense/policy co-production?  
As described in Chapter II, co-production is often 
described from in this context of macro-economic theory 
where it is used to describe the process by which a firm 
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and its customers collaborate to provide services with 
mutual benefits. (Xue and Harker, 2003)  Although co-
production is generally considered with regard customer 
efficiency and competitive markets, the rudiments of the 
theory accurately describes the manner by which DoD and the 
nation’s industrial base, and to a large extent, Congress, 
collaborate for the provision of defense. (Xue and Harker, 
2003)  
 (2) What was the sequence of events in the evolution 
 of the DoD-industry relationship? 
 Chapter III described the evolution of the defense 
industrial base beginning with World War II. The cyclical 
nature of defense spending over the last century has 
created significant challenges for both DoD and the defense 
industry. As a result the co-production of national defense 
has faced tremendous challenges since World War II. Major 
changes in domestic priorities, acquisition policies, and 
funding levels have all had a significant impact on how 
national security is provided. The most important and 
utterly unpredictable challenge however has been the 
emergence of the enemy threat. The horrific terrorist 
attacks on the United States in September 2001 marked the 
beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The 
uncertainties of this confrontation have made it clear that 
the nation’s ability to utilize its public and private 
sector assets will become increasingly important as the 
nation continues the combat the elusive and asymmetrical 
threat.     
 (4) How has the process and relationship evolved with 
 regard to the procurement of military services? 
 As described in Chapter IV, the relationship between 
the military and the private sector has changed 
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significantly the over the last several decades. Due 
largely to the changing threat and dwindling level of 
funding, the nation’s strategic guidance has yielded a 
Defense department that is highly focused on warfighting 
above all other tasks.  This has resulted in a larger role 
for contractors as more and more services are moved from 
the military domain to the private sector. In addition, 
DoD’s reliance on increasingly complex technology, manpower 
reductions and the demand of prosecuting conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have served to reinforce the union 
between the military and the defense industry in recent 
years. 
 (5) What are the potential benefits and pitfalls of 
 the increasing symbiosis between DoD and defense 
 industry? 
The clearest conclusion that may be derived from 
Chapter II through Chapter V is that the process of defense 
co-production yields both benefits and weaknesses, 
particularly for DoD.  
1. Benefits 
The products and services provided by the defense 
industrial base have proven to be force multipliers, 
particularly in times of conflict. The symbiotic 
relationship that has evolved has yielded technological 
innovation and advanced capabilities that could not have 
been otherwise attained within the same time frame.  Co-
production will remain an important mechanism for the 
foreseeable future as DoD continues to leverage its 
strategic focus on warfighting with the resources and 
support of the private sector. In addition, when DOD and 
Congress place stringent limits on active duty military 
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endstrength that are not commensurate with current force 
requirements contracting is necessary and inevitable to 
prosecute war successfully. 
2. Weaknesses 
Despite the critical benefits that it provides, 
defense co-production has significant disadvantages as 
well. As discussed in Chapter V, the level of oversight and 
official guidance has not kept pace with the evolving 
relationship between the defense institutions and private 
industry.  In addition, serious legal and operational 
issues remain regarding the roles and limitations pursuant 
to their interaction. Factors such as increasingly complex 
weapons systems and force reductions have made dependence 
on the defense industry vital to mission execution. The 
long-term effects of this dependence remain to be 
determined.   
These benefits and weaknesses of defense co-production 
are summarized in the following table.  
 * Force multiplier  * Inconsistent / unclear guidance
 * Consistent with current DoD initiatives  * Increased industry involvement results in
 * Often cheaper to outsource    greater influence of private sector, Congress
 * Allows DoD to focus on core competency-  * Oversight difficult to ensure / maintain
   warfighting  * DoD is held responsible for the actions of 
 * Exploits advantages of market economics:    contractors and sub-contractors
   Technological innovation, and competition,  * Legal issues remain with regard to "battlefield
   lowest bid    contractors"
 * Some weapon systems are too complex to be 
   repaired and maintained by military members
 * Operational command and control issues linger
Benefits Weaknesses
  







1. Must Develop Clear but Flexible Guidance  
One of the most prolific trends in defense co-
production is outsourcing. Despite this fact, there remains 
a dearth in guidance throughout DoD with regard to ensuring 
that sufficient oversight exists. This oversight is 
essential in order to prevent abuses and irregularities on 
both sides of the transaction. For this reason, it is 
recommended that DoD explicitly address the role of the 
private sector, particularly in the National Military 
Strategy, and the QDR. This will provide top-down an 
consistent guidance throughout the Department and enable 
military commanders to adequately prepare for contingencies 
when they arise. 
2. More User-Serviceable Systems and More Robust 
Backup Planning 
With DoD shifting its focus to performing primarily 
core competencies, many subsidiary functions that were once 
performed by military personnel are now being performed by 
civilians and contractors. In addition, the explosion in 
technology over the last two decades has yielded systems 
which require contractors to repair, maintain, and in some 
instances, operate. For these reasons, it is recommended 
that DoD examine its outsourced systems and services 
closely in order to ensure that mission critical 
capabilities are retained “in house”, or that sufficient 
backup planning exists to ensure that civilians and 
contractors will be able to provide their services on or 




3. The Core Competencies of Active Duty Forces Must 
Be Clearly Defined 
Although the 2001 QDR directed that DoD and the 
military components focus on warfighting as the 
organization’s core competency, it did not explicitly 
address the subsidiary functions that comprise it. 
Moreover, warfighting requires the coordination of a myriad 
of functions beyond combat, such as command and control, 
logistics, and information management. Each of these 
primary functions is comprised of a multitude of sub-
functions as well. For this reason, it is recommended that 
DoD and the military services disaggregate the warfighting 
competency in order to closely examine and determine which 
functions and sub-functions are essential to meet defense 
requirements and which are not. This information will be 
essential for establishing realistic constraints on the use 
of outsourcing and the role of defense contractors. 
4. Endstrength Must be Commensurate With Required 
Capability 
As DoD and the military components struggle to meet 
the demands of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, one of the most 
important factors that must be continually assessed is 
whether or not the endstrength of the force is commensurate 
with both the required operational capability and projected 
operational environment. Assessments are not enough 
however. Congress and the Pentagon must use defense co-
production as a means of ensuring that active duty military 
endstrength remains congruent with the requirements of both 





D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Cost Benefit Analysis Comparing the Use of 
Contractors to Active Duty Military 
Stringent limitations on military endstrength have led 
to increased reliance on contractors to perform roles that 
were once reserved for uniformed service members. The first 
step of this research would involve a quantitative 
examination of the costs and benefits of the use of 
contractors for DoD. The second part of this study would 
consist of a comparison of this economic data with the 
current and projected costs of employing primarily active 
duty military members in order to facilitate a 
determination of the true economic utility or disutility of 
military contractors.   
2. Explore DoD’s Progress With Regard to Issues 
Raised by the GAO 
The GAO study discussed in Chapter V revealed many 
challenges and deficiencies that plague the Pentagon’s 
reliance on contractors. This research would involve a 
thorough examination of DoD, the military components, and 
defense agencies to ascertain whether any of the 
recommended changes regarding the development of clear 
standards and guidance, identification of mission-essential 
contractor services or contingency planning have occurred 
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